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The Puzzle of Judicial Education
THE CASE OF CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM DE GREY
Emily Kadens †
Reading judicial memoirs from the last three centuries,
one gets the impression that the judge took the oath, stepped
onto the bench, and proceeded to fill the judicial role as if born
in the robe. Even those who admit to having had a learning
curve remain coy about what they did to teach themselves how
to be judges.1 When asked directly, however, judges readily
admit to the difficulties of learning their jobs.2 As one said,
“[B]ecoming a federal judge is like being thrown into the water

†

Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. J.D. University of
Chicago; Ph.D. Princeton. The author thanks the following people for their assistance:
Ross Davies, Richard Epstein, William Forbath, Mark Gergen, John Gordan III,
Elizabeth Haluska-Rausch, Philip Hamburger, Michael Hoeflich, Guy Holborn and the
staff of the Lincoln’s Inn Library, Dennis Hutchinson, Daniel Klerman, Stefanie
Lindquist, Michael McNair, the staff of the Norfolk Record Office, James Oldham, the
Honorable Lee Rosenthal, Renae Satterley, David Seipp, the Honorable Sam Sparks,
Anthony Taussig, Jay Westbrook, and Ernie Young.
1
See, e.g., Kathryn H. Vratil, Notes from the Bench, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 510 (1993) (discussing her experience upon joining the bench without going into
significant detail about her self-education).
2
See Robert Carp & Russell Wheeler, Sink or Swim: The Socialization of a
Federal District Judge, 21 J. PUB. L. 359, 367-70 (1972). Other studies of judicial
education include: Lenore Alpert, Burton M. Atkins & Robert C. Ziller, Becoming a
Judge: The Transition from Advocate to Arbiter, 62 JUDICATURE 325, 329-30 (1979);
Beverly Blair Cook, The Socialization of New Federal Judges: Impact on District Court
Business, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 253, 253-57; Susan L. Goldberg, Judicial Socialization:
An Empirical Study, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 423, 426-31 (1985); J. Woodford Howard, Jr.,
Judge Harold R. Medina: The “Freshman” Years, 69 JUDICATURE 127, 127 (1985); On
Becoming a Judge: Socialization to the Judicial Role, 69 JUDICATURE 139, 139 (1985)
[hereinafter On Becoming a Judge] (interview with a panel of legal professionals about
new judges and their effect on “American justice”); Thomas B. Russell, Bridging the
Gap: Between a Trial Lawyer’s Experience and Becoming a Good Judge Is a Distance
that Goes Beyond Ordinary Measurements, JUDGES J., Fall 1988, at 16, 56-57; Stephen
L. Wasby, “Into the Soup?”: The Acclimation of Ninth Circuit Appellate Judges, 73
JUDICATURE 10, 10-14 (1989); Paul Wice, Judicial Socialization: The Philadelphia
Experience, in COURTS AND JUDGES 149, 149-71 (James A. Cramer ed., 1981). For a
more general study of the “freshman effect” on opinion writing see Virginia A.
Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Acclimation Effects and
Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 792-93
(2003) and the literature cited there.
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and being told to swim.”3 Recognizing the need for formal
training, in the last fifty years both the federal and state
judiciaries have created what are affectionately known as baby
judge schools, short orientation programs primarily aimed at
instructing
trial-level
judges
in
law
and
judicial
4
administration.
Fifty years is a very short time in the life of a problem
that began at least as early as the sixteenth century, when the
English started to turn to experienced lawyers with no judicial
experience to staff their central common law courts.5 The
United States inherited this system of selecting its judges from
the general pool of lawyers, and thereby also inherited the
dilemma of training those neophyte judges in their new roles.6
Interestingly, however, despite evidence of the omnipresence of
judges’ need for education and the likelihood that early modern
judges were no more able to step seamlessly onto the bench
than their modern counterparts, scholars and historians of the

3

Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Alpert, Atkins & Ziller, supra note 2, at 330 (“It takes two or three years to get
to where you finally feel sure of yourself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); On
Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 140 (“Every judge I’ve ever talked to said, ‘yes,
there was a period in which I felt like a freshman.’”); Wasby, supra note 2, at 10
(“When I joined the court . . . I was left to stumble, bumble, and do injustice to other
people. I was given no manual, no orientation, [and] no one came forward to help.”
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
“Baby Judges School” Jump Starts Learning Process, THIRD BRANCH, Aug.
2005, at 1, 10 (federal baby judges school); Larry Berkson & Lenore Haggard, The
Education and Training of Judges in the United States, in MANAGING THE STATE
COURTS 145-49 (Larry C. Berkson, Steven W. Hays & Susan J. Carbon eds., 1977)
(detailing early history of state baby judges schools); Rex Bossert, A Week at Boot
Camp for Judges: Rookie Jurists Get a Crash Course and Swap Court Tips at Baby
Judge School, NAT’L L.J., Jul. 7, 1997, at A1 (federal baby judges school); Cook, supra
note 2, at 263-66 (early history of federal baby judge seminars); see also Russell, supra
note 2, at 17 (“Judicial education is a young science. It was only 25 years ago that the
National Judicial College was founded by judges who recognized their need for
professional judicial education.”).
5
The earliest English justiciars and justices, of course, had no judicial
experience prior to taking the bench. However, as discussed below, between the
fourteenth and sixteenth centuries judges were selected from among the serjeants-atlaw, leading lawyers who served a sort of judicial apprenticeship before taking the
bench. See discussion infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
6
See On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 142 (“Federal judicial
recruitment processes are almost tailor-made to pick people who don’t know an awful
lot about what they’re supposed to do to become a judge. I think typically the judges
are successful practitioners, which requires a certain degree of specialization, and they
get on the federal bench anyway and they’re faced with all sorts of civil rights and
constitutional law and criminal procedure questions about which they know relatively
little.”).
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judiciary have paid limited attention to the question of how an
appointee learns to be a judge.7
One reason for both the lack of scholarship and the need
for judicial education may be the mystique of the judge, whom
Blackstone called the “depositories of the law; the living
oracles.”8 In civil law countries, the judiciary has long been
viewed as a career, an honorable one, perhaps, but just one
amongst many choices a young lawyer could make. The law
student or law school graduate selects the judicial track,
receives focused training, and progresses up the hierarchy of
courts as his or her abilities, interests, and experience
warrant.9 In such a system, the fact of judicial education is
openly acknowledged. In common law countries, by contrast, a
judgeship long ago became a reward for a successful career as a
practitioner. It was not a career the young lawyer prepared for;
it was, and remains, the plum he hoped he might earn by
service in another branch of the law.10 This method of
appointing top lawyers to the bench encourages a mentality
that “the better the advocate, the better the judge is likely to
be,”11 and discourages admitting, as Chief Justice Warren
Burger did in an interview, that “not every person appointed is
immediately qualified to step right in and perform the
function.”12
The mystique of common law judges presumed to have
“learn[ed] their roles en route to office” also has consequences
7

See supra notes 2, 4 (literature on modern judicial education).
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69; see also JOHN P. DAWSON,
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW, at xi (1968) (saying that Blackstone’s comment “could not
have seemed at the time he wrote to be greatly exaggerated. The predominant role of
English judges in the creation and development of English law had been written for all
to see. To us in this country, some 200 years later, the influence of judges has if
anything increased.”).
9
The key elements across civil law system are that judges are formally
trained and that there are separate hierarchies for judges and lawyers. Systems vary
in how they recruit and train their judges. For the variations in some European judicial
training systems see JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE 52-58 (France); id. at
113-18, 120-24 (Germany); id. at 189-95 (Spain); id. at 244-46, 248-51 (Sweden); id. at
312-13, 319-20 (England) (2007).
10
DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND, 1727-1875: THE
RESHAPING OF A PROFESSIONAL ELITE 72-99 (1982); DAVID LEMMINGS, PROFESSORS OF
THE LAW: BARRISTERS AND ENGLISH LEGAL CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
275-81 (2000) (reviewing pre-judicial career paths of English judges); WILFRID R.
PREST, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR, 15901640, at 135 (1986) (“The highest prize within the legal profession itself was a judge’s
place in one of the superior courts of Westminster Hall . . . .”).
11
Howard, supra note 2, at 127 (paraphrasing Charles Evans Hughes, Jr.).
12
Interview with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 21, 1972, at 42.
8
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for scholarship.13 If the myth were true, then a study of judicial
education would be uninteresting, if it were even conceived of
at all. And because the perpetuation of the myth is
incompatible with judges discussing their methods of selftraining, evidence can be hard to come by.14 Thus it is hardly
surprising that so little has been written about the specific
steps new judges have taken to acquire the knowledge
necessary to serve on the court to which they have been raised.
But the myth is not true, and it has not been true for at
least two centuries, as this study of the education of judges in
eighteenth-century England, and specifically that of William de
Grey (1719-1781), who served as Chief Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas from 1771 to 1780, will try to demonstrate. This
Article draws on an unusual and heretofore unexplored
collection of archival material in Norwich, England and in
Lincoln’s Inn, London to shed some light on the way one
important and well-regarded judge addressed his knowledge
gap.15 Although a work of legal history, it borrows from the
discoveries of modern studies of judicial education to help give
meaning to the historical evidence. And although as a work of
history it claims to offer no lessons for the present, the story of
how de Grey and his brethren learned their jobs does suggest
the universality within the common law world of both the
problem of judicial training and its solution.
Current scholarship calls the process of learning to be a
judge “socialization.” In these works, socialization is a broad
13

Howard, supra note 2, at 127; see also Edson L. Haines, Judicial
Education, in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF INSPIRATIONAL AND
EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS FOR MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY 230, 231 (Glenn R. Winters
ed., 1975) (“Everyone seems content to operate on the assumption that the donning of
judicial robes makes a man competent to perform all duties of office.” In fact, however,
“[a] judge needs opportunity, time and assistance in the reduction of his ignorance. In
many instances it will not be a case of re-tooling—it will be tooling up for the first
time.”); Richard S. Arnold, Irving L. Goldberg Lecture, Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law: The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent, 56 SMU L. REV. 767,
771 (2003) (“You may find it a little disconcerting that people who are appointed to the
bench need to go to school to learn how to do it. We hope that they know something
before they are appointed . . . .”).
14
On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 139 (“I think one of the reasons we
have so little systematic and solid study of this is that it’s difficult.”).
15
For contemporaries’ views of de Grey, see 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 128 (1992) [hereinafter OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS]; 1 HORACE
TWISS, THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON 113 (London, John
Murray, 2d ed. 1844) (“One of the most considerable among the judges of that time was
Lord Chief Justice De Grey. ‘He was the object,’ says Mr. Farrer, ‘of Lord Eldon’s
highest commendation. He spoke of him as a most accomplished lawyer, and of most
extraordinary power of memory.’”).
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concept encompassing variously the pre-judicial career,
acclimation to institutional norms, integration into the court
organization, and acquisition of required knowledge.16 This
Article focuses on only one piece of the socialization puzzle:
that of education in the procedural and substantive law. To a
much lesser extent it touches on evidence of the transition from
advocate to judge and the familiarization with court
administration. By judicial education is meant any attempt to
learn the rules, procedures, or history of the court or to prepare
legal reference tools for use while hearing or preparing to hear
cases. It excludes the use of reports or of certain canonical
works in the preparation of opinions in the ordinary course of
the judge’s job. The citation to authorities was a normal part of
the opinion process for all judges of the time, whether new or
long-serving.
Furthermore, because most of the archival material
concerns the books Chief Justice de Grey bought or used during
his first two years on the bench, this Article concentrates on
the book-learning aspect of judicial education. An important
part of de Grey’s studies appears to have involved very basic
practice manuals and textbooks. That de Grey used books
ought to have been then, as now, unremarkable. Yet given the
insignificant attention such elementary works have garnered,
few legal historians might have guessed that a highly
experienced barrister like de Grey would have turned to basic
student manuals for his information. Such a finding introduces
a caveat into the current assumption that these sorts of works
played little role in the development of English law prior to the
nineteenth century.17 In other words, the de Grey materials
give entrée into two significant historical questions with
modern resonance: how did judges learn their jobs and what
kinds of texts shaped the development of the law?
Beyond the serendipity of the archival collections that
permit an at least partial reconstruction of what de Grey did to
teach himself how to be a judge, he is also an ideal exemplar
because he took a well-blazed path to the bench. Called to the
bar in 1742, he benefited early from patronage, became a king’s
16

See, e.g., Alpert, Atkins & Ziller, supra note 2, at 325-36; Cook, supra note
2, at 254; On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 140.
17
Michael Lobban, The English Legal Treatise and English Law in the
Eighteenth Century, 13 IURIS SCRIPTA HISTORICA 69, 70 (1997); A.W.B. Simpson, The
Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 639 (1981).
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counsel in 1758, solicitor general to the queen in 1761, solicitor
general in 1763, and finally attorney general in 1766.18 He was
a loyal government man, who served ten years in Parliament
and even turned down an offer of the Chancellorship.19 While
attorney general, he maintained a lucrative private practice,
becoming one of the first barristers to earn over £8000 in a
year.20 Such a résumé made him as completely qualified for his
judicial appointment as one could be at the time. If he needed
to read textbooks to learn the law and procedure of his court, so
would many other judges of the age.
After discussing in Part I the historical reasons for the
creation of the myth of the pre-trained judge and, conversely,
the reasons for a new judge’s lack of preparation, the Article
turns in Part II to the usual methods of judicial education
suggested by both the modern scholarship and the eighteenthcentury evidence. Part III investigates the set of procedural
books de Grey acquired soon after becoming a judge and asks
what he might have learned from them. Part IV examines how,
paralleling the practices of modern judges, he created his own
bench book for use at trial.
I.

WHY JUDGES NEEDED AN EDUCATION

The common law judiciary has been built on the
assumption that legal practice is the best preparation for being
a judge.21 Given centuries of evidence that practitioners quite
often do not “learn how to judge on the way to the bench,” this
belief must have its roots in the distant past.22 This Part argues
that the mystique of judicial preparedness arose from
conditions unique to the medieval English legal community,
while the need for education grew up in response to changes in
the way law was practiced from the sixteenth century onward.
In his classic work on the history of judges, John
Dawson points out a startling fact. In medieval and early
18

On de Grey’s early patronage positions, see LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at
162 and DUMAN, supra note 10, at 64-65.
19
Gordon Goodwin, rev. M. J. Mercer, Grey, William de, First Baron
Walsingham (1719-1781), in 23 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 897
(H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds. 2004) (giving a biography of de Grey); 4
HORACE WALPOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE THIRD 420 (London,
Richard Bentley 1845) (recounting refusal of offer of Chancellorship).
20
DUMAN, supra note 10, at 107.
21
See On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 139-41.
22
Id. at 139.
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modern France, the royal courts were staffed by thousands of
judges.23 By contrast, in England until the nineteenth century,
“the permanent judges of the central courts of common law and
Chancery, all taken together, rarely exceeded fifteen.”24 Those
central common law courts—King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and
Exchequer—sitting in Westminster and staffed, in de Grey’s
time, by four judges apiece, dealt with the mass of litigation
flowing in from all over England.25 On the one hand, therefore,
only an extremely small number of judges had to be prepared
to serve, and they could, in theory, be quickly socialized into
courts with a long institutional memory, a small bar, and a
coherent body of case law. On the other hand, a very few judges
carried the weight of the nation’s legal system on their
shoulders, and they needed to know what they were doing.
When seeking an answer to the question of the origin of
the belief that legal practice prepared judges for the bench, a
dominant factor seems to be the existence in the Middle Ages of
a single, tightly-knit hierarchy with the judge at the top as a
primus inter pares.26 Unlike the continental civil law judge
today, who is often largely isolated from the bar, the medieval
English judge spent his career immersed in it.27 He learned the
law as a student in an inn of court. He joined the inn when he
became a member of the bar and often progressed up the ranks
of its leadership.28 Normally, he practiced as a serjeant-at-law,
an elite group of senior barristers formed in the fourteenth
century who for a time had precedence at the bar, a monopoly
over pleading before the Court of Common Pleas, and a
presumptive right to judicial appointments.29 As a serjeant, the
future judge served a sort of judicial apprenticeship. He could
dine and have his chambers at the Serjeants’ Inns alongside
the judges, with whom he would discuss thorny legal issues

23

DAWSON, supra note 8, at 2.
Id. at 3.
25
Id. at 2-3.
26
6 JOHN BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1483-1558, at
411 (John Baker ed., 2003) [hereinafter BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY]; PREST, supra note
10, at 74.
27
BELL, supra note 9, at 79-80.
28
PREST, supra note 10, at 135-36.
29
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 157-58, 166
(4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter BAKER, INTRODUCTION]; JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, THE
ORDER OF SERJEANTS AT LAW: A CHRONICLE OF CREATIONS, WITH RELATED TEXTS AND A
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 14-15, 36, 42, 46 (1984) [hereinafter BAKER, SERJEANTS].
24
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and imbibe the collegiality of the bench.30 When a judge could
not go on assize, a serjeant would fill in, hearing cases with his
circuit partner, a real judge, nearby.31 Thus, by the time a
serjeant became a judge, he had acquired some experience of
judging, knew the members of the court, and had for years
watched them discuss and decide cases.
As a judge, he continued to participate in the same legal
community in which he had spent his career as a practitioner.
He retained a connection with his inn, and he mingled with the
serjeants, whom he called his “brothers,” in the Serjeants’
Inns.32 As a leading member of this legal community, the judge
was an important conduit for the body of orally-transmitted
knowledge called the “common erudition” or the “communis
opinio” that all active members of the bar shared.33 The
common erudition, worked out as much in the teaching
exercises and the discussions in the Inns of Court as from the
bench, created an oral tradition of “received learning.”34 Thus,
an experienced practitioner would presumably have possessed
much the same expertise as the judges just by having spent
sufficient time in the same legal culture. Consequently, it is not
difficult to imagine how a serjeant could be assumed to move
from bar to bench without needing to re-equip his toolkit.
But by the sixteenth century, a number of changes had
been set in motion that would end the hegemony of the
communis opinio, alter the practice of law, and turn judges into
a different species of legal officer rather than merely the most
esteemed lawyers among equals. First, the number and power
of ordinary barristers increased dramatically in the sixteenth
century. Where “[t]he medieval legal profession had been in
30

BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 166; 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY,
supra note 26, at 411-12; 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 15
(1938); cf. Wasby, supra note 2, at 13 (forms of judicial apprenticeship in the modern
American judicial system).
31
BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 166; BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra
note 29, at 36.
32
6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 411-12.
33
See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198; J.H. BAKER, THE LAW’S
TWO BODIES 67-70, 81-82, 161-69 (2001) [hereinafter BAKER, LAW’S TWO BODIES]; J.H.
Baker, The Inns of Court and Legal Doctrine, in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAW 37, 43, 50 (2000) [hereinafter Baker, Inns of Court];
David Ibbetson, Case-Law and Doctrine: a Historical Perspective on the English
Common Law, in RICHTERRECT UND RECHTSFORTBILDUNG IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN
RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 27, 34-35 (Reiner Schulze & Ulrike Seif eds., 2003).
34
See 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 471-72 (“[I]t was in the
inns, rather than in Westminster Hall, that those principles were expounded and
refined as a coherent body of law.”); BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198.
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effect a guild, whose journeyman members practised their
trade . . . under the oversight of a body of masters, the judges
and serjeants at law,” the early modern bar was more of an
open market, where men with ability or connections could rise
in the profession without being constrained by the old
hierarchy.35
From this group of upstarts there emerged in the
sixteenth century a new leadership: the solicitor and attorney
general and the king’s counsel.36 King’s counsel were royal law
officers who, though remaining members of the bar, took cases
on behalf of the King and could not appear against the Crown
in their private practice without license.37 The new king’s
counsel acquired a right of precedence in court, immediately
jumping over other members of the bar, including most
serjeants, in seniority.38 Being forever trapped beneath the
king’s counsel lessened the desirability of becoming a serjeant,
which in turn meant that the finest barristers were no longer
to be found amongst their ranks.39 Consequently, king’s counsel
became the preferred credential for judicial selection.40
By the mid-eighteenth century, although no single path
to the bench had emerged, certain “avenues of advancement”
were common, and these centered on indications of political
loyalty and excellence at the bar.41 Future judges usually spent
over two decades in practice before their elevation.42 Over half
were king’s counsel, and many had their preeminence at the
bar recognized by an appointment to serve as solicitor and/or
attorney general.43 In addition, half—and over ninety percent of
the chief justices of King’s Bench and Common Pleas—had
spent time in Parliament.44 These men may have been excellent
lawyers and in some instances skilled politicians, but they had
not necessarily been trained to serve as judges on the courts to
which they were appointed.

35

PREST, supra note 10, at 75.
See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 158; BAKER, SERJEANTS,
supra note 29, at 108, 111-14, 116-17; PREST, supra note 10, at 75.
37
BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 165.
38
Id. at 164-65.
39
See LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 174.
40
Id. at 262, tbl. 7.1, 264.
41
DUMAN, supra note 10, at 73.
42
Id. at 72.
43
Id. at 73-75.
44
Id. at 78, 87.
36
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This lack of training posed a particularly pressing
problem for the Court of Common Pleas because, with one
exception, only serjeants could appear before that court.45 The
sole exception was the attorney general, who was permitted “to
address the court from within the bar as an officer, though not
to take the place of a serjeant at the bar. . . .”46 But such
appearances seem to have been rare and occurred only in the
attorney general’s official capacity and not in his private
practice.47 Yet, despite the serjeants’ monopoly over the Court,
during the eighteenth century the most trod path to the chief
justiceship of Common Pleas lay precisely through service as
the attorney general.48 Almost by definition, this man had not
been a serjeant, and while he may have appeared before the
Court occasionally in his governmental role, he did not have
the day-to-day expertise gained by long attendance at the
Court’s bar.49 Indeed, given the status of Common Pleas in that
era as second fiddle to King’s Bench, the new chief justice may
not even have observed the Court very often while a student or
young barrister.50 Furthermore, Common Pleas had remained a
more traditionally procedural and black letter court than
Chancery or King’s Bench, where the former attorney general
was likely to have spent much of his time.51 The new chief may
consequently have come to his job quite unfamiliar with the
45

BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra note 29, at 42.
Id. at 43 n.5.
47
Wilson’s Common Pleas Reports for the period 1753 to 1774 include only
one explicit mention of the Attorney General appearing before the Court. Rex v.
Serjeant Mead, (1754) 2 Wils. 17. Even in the famous case of King v. Wilkes, when the
Common Pleas granted Wilkes’s petition for habeas corpus, Wilson only records
serjeants arguing on behalf of the Crown. King v. Wilkes, (1763) 2 Wils. 151, 156. A
search of the Court’s rule books would undoubtedly turn up more appearances, but the
fact remains that the attorney general did not spend a great deal of his time before the
Court.
48
DUMAN, supra note 10, at 84, 87.
49
None of the solicitors or attorneys general of the eighteenth century had
been serjeants.
50
See LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 172, 174; ROSE A. MELIKAN, JOHN SCOTT,
LORD ELDON, 1751-1838: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 154 (1999) (calling Common Pleas
“something of a judicial backwater”); 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note
15, at 124-25; James C. Oldham, Underreported and Underrated: The Court of
Common Pleas in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW AS CULTURE AND CULTURE AS LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN PHILIP REID 119, 119 (John Philip Reid, Hendrik Hartog,
William E. Nelson & Barbara Wilcie Kern eds., 2000).
51
See BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra note 29, at 117; 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
30, at 452-53; LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 183 (“[L]ists of leading counsel show that
the attorney-general and solicitor-general, whose privileged positions allowed them to
pick and choose among the most lucrative briefs, generally chose to concentrate their
private practice in Chancery.”).
46
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basic operation of the court over which he found himself
presiding.
At the same time as the number of lawyers expanded
and the path to the bench ceased to lead inexorably through an
apprenticeship as a serjeant, the communis opinio also broke
down.52 In the Middle Ages, the primary arena of interest to the
legal community had been the back and forth between pleaders
and judges aimed at the establishment of the pleadings in each
case. “[M]uch of th[is] debate was tentative, extempore and
inconclusive,” looking not so much for a ruling but rather for an
indication of the tactical moves the pleader should make.53 But
by the sixteenth century, the lawyers had begun to draft their
pleadings in writing, working them out between the parties,
and without the assistance of the judges.54 When the case did
finally come before the court on a point of law, the lawyers
wanted answers, not debate, and those answers were supposed
to be supported by chapter and verse citation to the case law
reported more and more in authoritative, printed works.55
As a result, the position of the judge within the legal
hierarchy changed. He was no longer the master who labored
side-by-side with his journeymen. He now sat apart, tasked to
rule on disputes brought before him, and confronted with the
prospect that his words would be captured by reporters,
published, and cited as the law in the future. If the
observations of modern judges are any guide, this was a
seismic shift. Judges today speak of the difficulty of learning
“that there comes a time when he or she has to make a
decision.”56 This is not a skill that a lawyer, even one who
counsels clients rather than litigates, necessarily has to
master.
The difficulty of moving from advocate to decisionmaker can be glimpsed on de Grey’s court in the 1770s. The
52

See Ibbetson, supra note 33, at 34-35 (discussing the decline of the
communis opinio during the sixteenth century and its disappearance by 1600); see also
BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198-99; Baker, Inns of Court, supra note 33,
at 50-51; Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers:
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 229,
267-68 (1998).
53
BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 197-98; see also 6 BAKER, OXFORD
HISTORY, supra note 26, at 386-89.
54
See 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 338-39.
55
See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198.
56
On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 142. (“The inability to make
decisions is an occupational hazard to which an unusually large number of our trial
judges are exposed to and exhibit.”).
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most junior justice on the Court was George Nares, who had
spent over a decade as a serjeant and a leader of the Common
Pleas bar.57 He also did an active business in writing opinions of
counsel advising on questions of law based on a set of facts
presented by the client or solicitor.58 With regard to the
substantive law and procedure, Nares probably had little to
learn when he took the bench. He knew the case law of the
Court better than any of his brethren, a fact he demonstrated
frequently in his opinions, which were generally reported as
consisting of little more than citing precedential cases, usually
from Common Pleas and usually ones that had been decided
while he was at the bar.59 Yet of all his colleagues, he also
seems to have had the most trouble becoming accustomed to
making up his mind and was unsurprisingly not considered a
strong judge.60
57

See BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra note 29, at 528; LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at
172. Nares was said to have been “bred an att[orne]y, called to the bar.” Bray Family
Papers, Surrey History Centre, G52/8/10/1, s.v. George Nares (recollections by the
solicitor, William Bray, of leading people of his time, in alphabetical order by last name
of person, no page numbers).
58
See BAKER, LAW’S TWO BODIES, supra note 33, at 87-88. For a large
collection of Nares’s opinions, see Philadelphia Free Library, MS. LC.14.77.
59
E.g., Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 15, fol. 32
(Parsons v. Lloyd, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 845; 3 Wils. 341) (citing cases); The Warden and the
Commonalty of the Mystery of Grocers v. Backhouse, (1771) 3 Wils. 221, 227 (comment
at the end of the first argument, citing precedent); Sanderson v. Baker, (1772) 3 Wils.
309, 317 (“I know of three actions of trespass against the sheriff in cases of this kind.
Tyler versus Johnson, B.R. tried at Stafford in 1764 . . . ; I remember a similar case
tried before Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, who was of opinion . . . ; I also remember a
third action of the same kind . . . .”); Stevenson v. Hardie, (1773) 2 Bl. 872, 874;
Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 11, fol. 66 (“J. Nares was of ye
same op[inio]n and to prove that the copyh[ol]d does not derive und[e]r ye L[or]d he
cited these cases . . . all w[hi]ch he observed.”); see also Smedley v. Hill, (1776) 2 W. Bl.
1105, 1106 (Nares had tried the case and had made a ruling on evidence that was
overturned en banc. Blackstone reported that Nares “with great candour admitted the
determination to be wrong; and cited a case before Willes, C.J. . . . wherein such
evidence was admitted.”).
60
Bray Family Papers, Surrey History Centre, G52/8/10/1,, s.v. Nares.
Samples of Nares’s inability to make up his mind can be found in Cox v. Chubb, (1772)
2 W. Bl. 809, 810; Glead v. McKay, (1774) 2 W. Bl. 956, 957; Flureau v. Thornhill,
(1776) 2 W. Bl. 1078, 1079. In Howell v. Hanforth, according to de Grey’s bench notes,
Nares said that he at first disagreed with the rule the majority put forth because the
plaintiff had not followed the proper procedure but then let himself be persuaded to
agree. William de Grey Bench Notes, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS. 183, fol. 21r.
When presiding over a trial on circuit in 1776, Nares had to rule on the admissibility of
evidence. Plaintiff had brought suit against a pastor for non-residence in his rectory
and wanted to introduce evidence that the pastor had confessed himself to be the
rector. Defendant objected that such parol evidence was inadmissible. Unable to decide,
Nares “sent to consult Forster Serj[ean]t (who went that Circuit with him as Judge) &
by him was informed that ye same point had been determined lately on the Norfolk
Circuit by Willes J. The plaintiff therefore was nonsuited.” The following term, King’s
Bench set aside the nonsuit, finding that such parol evidence against the interest of
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Beyond learning how to make a decision, the new judge
also had to know the law and procedure of his court, and this
could pose a problem because, by at least the seventeenth
century, some leading members of the bar had begun to
specialize.61 A man might have all or most of his practice in
Chancery—a court of equity whose rules and procedures were
quite different from those of the common law courts62—or take
primarily revenue cases in Exchequer, or do criminal work at
the London criminal court, the Old Bailey, and King’s Bench.63
Because Chancery was the court of choice for
eighteenth-century legal “high-flyers,” many newly-appointed
chief justices in de Grey’s time found that their “promotion to a
chief justiceship . . . involved hasty revision of their old
common law knowledge, and no little personal nervousness
about their competence on the bench.”64 Philip Yorke, who had
primarily practiced in Chancery after achieving some renown
as a barrister, and who thereafter served as chief justice of
King’s Bench from 1733 to 1737,65 worried that “he had
forgot[ten] his old practice in [King’s Bench] for many years
and was extremely uneasy how he should acquit himself in his
new office.”66 A similar concern about his lack of familiarity
with the common law was expressed about the appointment of
the Chancery practitioner, Dudley Ryder, to the chief
justiceship of King’s Bench in 1754.67 De Grey faced this
problem as well, for he had spent much of the approximately

defendant was admissible. Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS. 551,
fols. 17b-18 (Beavan v. Williams, before Nares at Hereford Spring Assize, 1776).
61
See PREST, supra note 10, at 70-71.
62
See LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 184 (“[E]quity cases . . . traditionally
depended on natural law, reason, and ‘conscience’ rather than the issues of law or fact
tried at common law.”).
63
Id. at 169, 171, 177-78, 181, 210-11.
64
Id. at 171.
65
Peter D. G. Thomas, Yorke, Philip, First Earl of Hardwicke (1690-1764), in
60 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 847-49 (2004).
66
Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, Yorke received
the chief justiceship of King’s Bench rather than becoming Chancellor because the
other candidate, “Charles Talbot, . . . was almost exclusively an equity lawyer, with
little knowledge of the Common Law; and he would have found the duties of Chief
Justice of the King’s Bench . . . both difficult and distasteful. He desired ardently to
remain in the Court of Chancery.” 1 PHILIP C. YORKE, THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF PHILIP YORKE, EARL OF HARDWICKE, LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN
117 (1913). At the time, Yorke, who also had a large Chancery practice, was attorney
general and Talbot solicitor general. Id. at 116.
67
LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 171 n.77.
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twenty years prior to his appointment as a Chancery
barrister.68
Finally, the early modern English common law judge
did not take the bench prepared to do his job because the scope
of that job had widened considerably over the centuries to
include matters that no individual practitioner would have
mastered. In addition to his central tasks of hearing questions
of law when sitting en banc at Westminster Hall and questions
of fact when presiding individually over jury trials held during
circuits (called assizes) twice a year in the country, the judge
also heard both civil and criminal trials in London and
Westminster throughout the year, served on admiralty and
ecclesiastical appeals panels alongside civilian lawyers and
churchmen, advised the House of Lords acting in its judicial
capacity, advised the government on pardons in criminal cases,
helped Parliament draw up legislation and advised it on
petitions, and decided administrative appeals on tax matters.69
68

Id. at 353 (listing de Grey as one of the leaders of the Chancery bar in
1770). In de Grey’s papers are several sets of accounts of fees received from 1764-1770.
The accounts separate out the source of the fees, for example, briefs in King’s Bench, or
Chancery, or Exchequer. De Grey only listed Common Pleas once in that time. The
1764 account has an entry: “King’s Bench & Common Pleas……115:7—.” This appears
to be his fees for being on brief in arguments before these two courts. (In later accounts
this is made more explicit.) By way of comparison, the same year, out of a total income
of over £4623, he earned over £237 for briefs in Exchequer and £114 9s. for briefs in the
“Cockpit,” a reference to the Privy Council chamber at Whitehall Palace. See GEORGE
H. CUNNINGHAM, LONDON: BEING A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF THE HISTORY,
TRADITION & HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIONS OF BUILDINGS & MONUMENTS, ARRANGED
UNDER STREETS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER 789 (1927); 2 EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER,
THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES
1603-1784, at 43, 49 (1928). The same trends appear throughout the accounts. He
earned far more on Chancery briefs than in any other court, but also substantial
amounts in Exchequer, and in briefs for the House of Lords. In 1766 and 1770, he listed
no briefs in King’s Bench. His 1768 King’s Bench fees were his highest for that court at
just over £264 (though this also included Old Bailey briefs), but his Exchequer total
that year was over £313. See Accounts of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
XIII/6/3-8, 10. Even while solicitor and attorney general, he was seemingly almost
entirely absent from the motions books of King’s Bench. By contrast, his predecessor in
those two positions, Fletcher Norton, had been a constant presence in the motions
books while holding the royal offices. See King’s Bench Rule Books, National Archives
(Kew, London), KB 125/158 (1763-64), KB 125/160 (1767), KB 125/161 (1769).
69
Concerning the job of the common law court judges see variously:
ABSTRACT OF CASES AND DECISIONS ON APPEALS RELATING TO THE TAX ON SERVANTS
passim (London, T. Longman & T. Cadell 1781) (on tax appeals); G.I.O. DUNCAN, THE
HIGH COURT OF DELEGATES 178-81 (1971) (on ecclesiastical appeals); 1 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 244-45 (7th ed. 1956) (sitting as an appellate
court in Exchequer Chamber); 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15,
118-19 (sitting en banc at Westminster and at trials in London and Westminster), 13536 (concerning pardons); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 115 (London, J. Butterworth 2d ed. 1827) (on trials en banc
at Westminster); A.S. TURBERVILLE, THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN THE XVIIITH CENTURY
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Add to this that the chief justice served on the privy council,70
and that he had to manage a large staff of mostly sinecured
underlings with often obstructive traditions to which they
clung as their prerogative, and the difficulty of the job becomes
readily apparent.71
Referring to the baby judge school, one recent judicial
appointee said, “I cannot imagine taking on such a multifaceted
responsibility as becoming a federal district judge without
having such classes and materials available . . . .”72 An
eighteenth-century English judge had responsibilities far more
multifaceted than his modern counterpart could imagine, and
he had no orientation course to attend. Yet he must have
figured out how to do his job, for the English legal system did
not grind to a halt, and “the perpetuation of the judicial system
[is] dependent on the successful socialization of its judges.”73
The next Part explores how he might have accomplished this.
II.

THE METHODS OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION

According to modern studies of judicial education,
judges use four basic strategies to teach themselves what they
need to know to do their jobs. First, they rely on skills they
acquired before joining the court.74 Second, they learn on the
fly, for example, by asking lawyers at trial to review the law
and precedent.75 Third, they consult “more experienced
colleagues.”76 Finally, they read books in an organized program
of self-study.77 Nowadays, of course, they might also attend
baby judge schools and continuing judicial education courses,
10-11 (1927) (advising the House of Lords); John H. Langbein, Shaping the EighteenthCentury Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8, 34-35
(1983) (presiding at Old Bailey trials); the eighteenth-century Journals of the House of
Lords are full of references to petitions being referred to the judges and the judges
being ordered to draw up a new bill.
70
2 TURNER, supra note 68, at 25-26.
71
See, for example, the cases that came before de Grey and Common Pleas
concerning the tradition of the Court’s sealing office to close on certain days that were
not Court holidays and to charge exorbitant fees for deigning to seal documents on
those days. Sparrow v. Cooper (1779) 2 W. Bl. 1314, 1314-15; Figgins v. Willie (1778) 2
W. Bl. 1186, 1186-87.
72
“Baby Judges School” Jump Starts Learning Process, supra note 4, at 1
(internal quotation marks omitted).
73
Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 363-64.
74
Id. at 369-71.
75
Id. at 380-81.
76
Id. at 374-76.
77
Id. at 387.
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but such classes are arguably not a great deal more than an
extension of talking to colleagues and reading books.
Eighteenth-century judges also apparently employed
the same four learning strategies. The normal pre-judicial
preparation has already been discussed, so the focus here will
be on the other three methods. Of the group, the evidence for
learning on the fly is the most limited. Reporters did not record
verbatim what was said in court,78 and they may have been
particularly unlikely to write down, and later publish,
examples of judges demonstrating their ignorance.
Nonetheless, we do conserve at least two cases in which
relatively new chief justices of Common Pleas admitted to not
knowing the law. In the first, from 1784, Chief Justice
Loughborough, who joined the Court in 1780 when de Grey
resigned, asked for an explanation of the meaning of the
statute under dispute, demonstrating in his disagreement with
counsel that he did not understand the intent of the provision.79
Justice Gould, at this time the longest-serving member of the
court, explained the act, eliciting from Loughborough an
astonished, “I had no Idea in all my practice but [that?] it
extends to Cases prosecuted.”80 In the second instance, from
1800, Lord Eldon, who had become chief justice only seven
months before, made a similar remark in court: “I confess, that
when this application was first made, I was not aware, that
under the circumstances of the case the Defendant was entitled
to demand judgment: but my Brother Heath has satisfied me
that the application is supported by the current of
78

See, e.g., CAPEL LOFFT, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF
KING’S BENCH, at xi, xiii (W. Strahan and M. Woodfall, 1776) (although claiming to
take down the opinions “almost verbatim,” acknowledging that he did not necessarily
include everything that was said and did sometimes merely summarize) (emphasis
omitted); 1 SYLVESTER DOUGLAS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
COURT OF KING’S BENCH; IN THE NINETEENTH, TWENTIETH, AND TWENTY-FIRST YEARS
OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III, at xiv (London, His Majesty’s Law-Printers, 2d ed. 1786)
(“The judgments of the court I could have wished to give in the words in which they
were delivered. But this I often found to be impracticable, as I neither write shorthand, nor very quickly. Memory, however, while the case was recent, supplied at home,
many of the chasms which I had left in court . . . .”).
79
Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 21, fols. 119-120
(Nixon v. Clarke (1784)) (concerning the interpretation of an act instructing that if an
excise officer obtained a certificate of probable cause from a judge before executing a
seizure, the plaintiff should get no court costs). Alexander Wedderburn (Lord
Loughborough, later Earl of Rosslyn) was attorney general from 1778 to 1780, chief
justice of Common Pleas from 1780 to 1793, and Chancellor from 1793 to 1801.
Alexander Murdoch, Wedderburn, Alexander, First Earl of Rosslyn (1733-1805), in 57
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 909.
80
Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 21, fol. 121.
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authorities.”81 Similarly, special juries of merchants often
educated judges on commercial customs and practices in
mercantile cases.82
Some evidence suggests that new judges also used the
third method of education and sought advice from their more
knowledgeable colleagues not only about legal matters but also
about life on the court. Lord Mansfield, when he became chief
justice of King’s Bench, sent drafts of his opinions to two of his
well regarded associate justices for their advice, and the third,
Thomas Denison, supposedly taught Mansfield about
pleading.83 Mansfield’s predecessor, Dudley Ryder, received
advice from his predecessor, Charles Yorke, that “Denison
would be a useful man in point of law to me especially in the
form [of pleading] in which he was very good.”84 Ryder took
Yorke’s suggestion and consulted Denison, “who ‘professed
great readiness to acquaint me of everything he knew.’”85 And
when John Eardley Wilmot joined the Court and confessed a
concern about hearing cases on circuit, Denison volunteered to
“go with him all round the circuit because of the difficulty of
the judge’s going the first time.”86
Unlike Mansfield and Ryder, however, de Grey had no
group of experienced associate—or puisne—justices to advise
him when he took the bench.87 George Nares joined the Court
the same day he did, and William Blackstone had only been

81

Keepers & Governors of the Possession, &c. of Harrow School v. Alderton,
(1800) 2 Bos. & Pul. 86, 87; E. A. Smith, Scott, John, First Earl of Eldon (1751-1838),
in 49 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 420-21. “Heath”
was John Heath, who became a judge on the Common Pleas when Blackstone died in
1780.
82
See, for example, the 1798 maritime case of Thwaits v. Angerstein before
King’s Bench, where Chief Justice Kenyon “professed himself totally ignorant of
navigation, except in so far as he had learned it from his apprenticeship in his judicial
office. He had received a great deal of information from the different classes of
merchants by whom he had had the honour of being assisted in the administration of
justice.” Law Report, TIMES, Nov. 14, 1798, at 3. (The author thanks James Oldham for
this reference.)
83
1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 53, 55.
84
Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
Id. at 55.
86
Id. at 55 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 129-30
(detailing entries in the Ryder diaries concerning information he learned from other
judges and court officers about the various circuits).
87
Cf. 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 53, 55 (Dudley
Ryder, Chief Justice of King’s Bench from 1754 to 1756 and his successor, Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788, both took advice from their more
experienced puisne justices).
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appointed the previous year.88 De Grey could and perhaps did
rely on his senior puisne, Henry Gould, a solid judge who was
then in his eighth year on Common Pleas.89 But the new Chief
Justice may not have known Gould very well, for before his
appointment Gould had been an unremarkable barrister, had
never been a member of Parliament, and had been serving on a
court before which de Grey did not practice.90
Perhaps as a consequence of having no colleague to
whom he felt comfortable turning for guidance, de Grey chose
(at least in part) the final method: he read books. In his first
ten months on the bench, he purchased six basic books on
pleading and procedure. The following year, he bought a new
edition of Francis Buller’s Introduction to the Law Relative to
Trials at Nisi Prius and proceeded to restructure it into a
bench book to which he could refer while on circuit. The specific
details of these acquisitions and how de Grey used them will be
examined in the following two Parts. For now, the question is
not only why de Grey sought information from books but also
88

2 W. Bl. at 734-35.
On Gould as a judge, see Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone’s Common Law
Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). Blackstone, for instance, at least
twice sought Gould’s advice on cases. 2 THE POLYANTHEA: OR, A COLLECTION OF
INTERESTING FRAGMENTS, IN PROSE AND VERSE: CONSISTING OF ORIGINAL ANECDOTES,
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES, DIALOGUES, LETTERS, CHARACTERS, ETC. 195 (London, J.
Budd 1804) (Letter from Blackstone to Gould datable to April 1774). Blackstone wrote:
“Mr. Blackstone hopes he has not been too presumptuous in thus intruding a second
time on Mr. Justice Gould’s goodness, which nothing but an anxiety to perform the task
which he has undertaken with as much accuracy as possible, would have induced him
to have done.” Id.
90
Gould appears to have obtained his appointment to the bench (originally to
the Exchequer, then after two years to Common Pleas) by means of patronage. His wife
had an “interest” with the Chancellor at the time, and the Chancellor appointed puisne
justices. Bray, supra note 57, s.v. Gould. On barristers knowing the Common Pleas
judges see the observations of the lawyer, Isaac Espinasse, about bar and bench
relations in the 1790s: “With the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, or Barons of the
Exchequer, the members of the King’s Bench Bar had little intercourse. It was confined
to occasional meetings at nisi prius or on the circuit.” [Isaac Espinasse], My
Contemporaries: from the Note-Book of a Retired Barrister, 6 FRASER’S MAG. 220, 427
(1832). This would have been less true of de Grey, who would have interacted with the
judges in his position as solicitor and then attorney general, but his dealings with
Gould may have been limited to the performance of his official functions. However, if
the chocolate and on one occasion, diet bread, de Grey purchased for Gould can be
understood as his way of showing his appreciation, then during his years as chief de
Grey probably came to rely heavily on his senior puisne, in particular because bad
episodes of gout frequently forced de Grey to miss sittings. See, e.g., Accounting
Records of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/16/13 (Feb. 24, 1780)
(“[P]aid for Diet Bread for Mr. Justice Gould at Westmr 0.0.6.”); id. (Feb. 14, 1780)
(“[P]aid for Chocolate for Mr. Justice Gould at Guild Hall 0.1.0.”). Other examples of
records showing de Grey buying chocolate for Gould are at: Norfolk Record Office, WLS
LV/13/14 (June 14, 1776 and June 24, 1776); WLS LV/13/20 (April 26, 1776).
89
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why he selected the particular sorts of practice manuals and
reference works he did.
In an early but still seminal study of modern judicial
education, the authors found that “the judge himself is
responsible for much of his own socialization simply by going to
his library and consulting the casebooks, legal treatises,
reporters, and statute books which pertain to his particular
judicial problems.”91 One judge interviewed admitted that his
judicial education consisted of “an extensive study program, on
the weekends and even at night.”92 For de Grey, too, turning to
books may have been second nature. He came of age in the
legal profession at a time when students embarking upon a
legal career depended on textbooks for much of their education.
The decline of the teaching function of the Inns of Court in the
seventeenth century and the uncertainty of receiving any real
training as a law clerk had given books a vital role in preparing
students for the bar.93 Having been acculturated as students to
learning the law from books, lawyers appear to have continued
the practice once they entered the profession.94 In response, the
legal printers produced a growing stock of textbooks, practice
manuals, treatises, and reference works to meet the demands
of both students and practitioners.95 It should come as no
surprise, therefore, that those same lawyers, when they

91

Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 387.
Id.
93
See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 85-87 (describing how students
educated themselves); LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 136-37, 139-40, app. B (discussing
advice given in the eighteenth century to law students, listing books to be read); THE
DIARY OF DUDLEY RYDER 1715-1716, at 49, 91, 147, 184, 281, 87, 113, 116 (William
Matthews ed., 1939) (discussing the law books he was studying while a law student);
Tariq A. Baloch, Law Booksellers and Printers as Agents of Unchange, 66 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 389, 419-20 (2007) (quoting letter of a law clerk giving advice in the 1790s to a new
law student about what books to read); Lobban, supra note 17, at 70 (decline of Inns
and use of commonplace books).
94
Lobban, supra note 17, at 71, 73 (eighteenth-century market in books
aimed at lawyers); Ian Williams, “He Creditted more the Printed Booke”: Common
Lawyers’ Receptivity to Print (c. 1550-1640) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author). With regard to lawyers’ use of practice books and treatises, some evidence
includes the notes Henry Bathurst, eventually a judge on Common Pleas, took on
Geoffrey Gilbert’s treatise on evidence, see Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/LB/1/22/2,
vol. 7; Michael Foster’s notes on Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, JOHN BAKER & ANTHONY
TAUSSIG, A CATALOGUE OF THE LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS OF ANTHONY TAUSSIG 167 (2007)
(ms. F2); Chief Justice John Willes’s mention of “Booth on Real Actions” and “Mr.
Pigot’s Book of Recoveries” in opinions from 1742 and 1744 respectively (Willes 344,
345 and 444, 451).
95
6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 499-504; Lobban, supra note
17, at 73-74.
92
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ascended to the bench, returned once again to their books to
teach themselves the law they now needed as judges.
Fortunately, it is not necessary merely to speculate on
the judges’ knowledge of such books. Evidence from their
opinions indicates that they were familiar with a wide range of
practice books and recent treatises. The overwhelming majority
of books cited in Common Pleas in the 1770s were case reports
or the sorts of canonical works Coke discussed in the preface to
his tenth volume of reports in 1614 and that Blackstone
denominated works of “intrinsic authority”: Brooke’s, Rolle’s,
and Fitzherbert’s Abridgments; Littleton’s Tenures; Coke on
Littleton; Fitzherbert’s New Natura Brevium; Bracton’s de
Legibus; Coke’s Book of Entries, all works by de Grey’s time
written well in the distant past.96 Nonetheless, a few more
recent books also appeared in counsels’ arguments and the
judges’ opinions. Chief among them were Hale’s and Hawkins’s
Pleas of the Crown, Gilbert’s History of the Common Pleas,
Viner’s Abridgment, and Comyns’s Digest. Two of these—the
Gilbert and the Comyns—would reappear on the list of books
de Grey bought in his first months on the bench.97
More unexpectedly, the opinions indicate the judges’
familiarity with the sorts of modern treatises and practice
manuals with which they presumably had grown up
professionally. In 1738, John Willes, chief justice of Common
Pleas from 1737 to 1761, called the book, The Common Law
Epitomiz’d: With Directions How to Prosecute and Defend
Personal Actions, Very Useful for All Lawyers, Justices of Peace,
and Gentlemen (1660), by William Glisson and Anthony
Gulston “a book of good credit,” and George Townesend’s Tables
of Most of the Printed Presidents of Pleadings, Writs and Retort
of Writs at the Common Law (1667) “a book of very good
authority.”98 In a 1757 case he “rel[ied] much” upon that “most
excellent book,” William Sheppard’s 1641 Touchstone of
Common Assurances, an early work on conveyancing.99 In 1771,
Justice Gould made a similar approbatory comment in Dawkes
v. De Lorane, a case concerning the non-payment of a bill of
exchange.100 Plaintiff’s counsel objected that defense counsel
96

See 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 33743 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72.
97
See notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
98
Kettle v. Bromsall, (1738) Willes 118, 120 (C.B.).
99
Roe d. Wilkinson v. Tranmer, (1757) 2 Wils. 75, 78 (C.B.).
100
(1771) 3 Wils. 207.
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“had got all his cases out of Mr. Cunningham’s book of Bills of
Exchange.”101 Timothy Cunningham’s The Law of Bills of
Exchange, Promissory Notes, Bank-notes, and Insurances was
first published in 1760, and its author was still alive at the
time of Dawkes.102 But the recent vintage of the work did not,
apparently, bother Gould, whose response to plaintiff’s
complaint was to assert that, “Mr. Cunningham’s book was a
very good book.”103
De Grey relied far more explicitly on a modern treatise
in his jury instructions in the case of Sayre v. Rochford in
1776.104 In October 1775, a successful American banker living in
London, Stephen Sayre, had been arrested and detained on
charges of conspiring to overthrow the King.105 An American
officer serving in the British Army had alerted the Secretary of
State, Lord Rochford, to the plot. Sayre was released from
custody after six days for lack of credible evidence, but not
before Rochford’s officers had searched his house and removed
his papers.106 Sayre sued for illegal search and seizure and false
imprisonment, and de Grey presided over the trial.107 A
transcript of the witness testimony and of counsels’ arguments
was published at the time, but it excluded the jury
instructions.108 However, the court reporter, William Blanchard,
took what appear to be verbatim notes of de Grey’s discussion
of the law and summation of the facts, and he presented a

101

Id. at 212.
TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NOTES, BANK-NOTES, AND INSURANCES (London, W. Owen 1760). Apparently the old
rule of etiquette that judges may not cite living authors did not extend to counsel. See
DAWSON, supra note 8, at 97; WILLIAM POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION
29 (2007).
103
Dawkes v. De Lorane, 3 Wils. at 212. A bit later in the argument Gould
drew support from “a little book called Lex Mercatoria,” id., which could have been
Gerard Malynes’s oft-reprinted Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria, first published in
1622, though at two volumes that was hardly a “little book.” Other possible candidates
include Giles Jacobs’s 1718 work Lex Mercatoria, or, The Merchant’s Companion and
Wyndam Beawes’s massive 1752 Lex Mercatoria Rediviva.
104
JOSEPH GURNEY, THE TRIAL OF THE CAUSE ON AN ACTION BROUGHT BY
STEPHEN SAYRE, ESQ. AGAINST THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM HENRY EARL OF
ROCHFORD (London, C. Kearsely 1776).
105
A summary of the plot can be found in James Lander, A Tale of Two
Hoaxes in Britain and France in 1775, 49 HIST. J. 995, 1013-17 (2007).
106
Id.
107
See generally GURNEY, supra note 104.
108
See generally id.
102
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clean copy to the Chief Justice as a gift.109 This manuscript is
extant in the de Grey archives.110
De Grey, who clearly believed that Rochford should be
found blameless, took great pains in explaining the controlling
legal principles to the jury.111 He borrowed the law he applied
straight from that “very learned & able modern writer,”112 Sir
Michael Foster (1689-1763), late Justice of the Court of King’s
Bench and author of a work published in 1762 that combined
reports of criminal trials with short “discourses” on various
aspects of criminal law.113 De Grey followed the gist, as well as
the rhetoric, of Foster’s chapter on “High Treason in
Compassing the King’s Death.”114
De Grey instructed the jury, adhering to Foster, that
intent to imprison the King—supposedly Sayre’s plan—was
alone sufficient to support a charge of high treason, even if
mere intent to imprison an ordinary person would not be a
crime. He continued:
In the same learned author I mentioned to you before—it is said—
writings not published but found in a mans [sic] Closet may be under
circumstances evidence of high Treason. Letters & correspondence
proved to be sent—the sending in such Case is an ouverte Act or the
Evidence of an Ouverte Act at least that would be high Treason
connected with the design that I mentioned and used as the Means
or measure of effectuating the intent—nay that is so far settled in
Law That Words & Discourse may be evidence of high Treason—may
be Ouverte Acts of High Treason. And as this is going a great way
and treading upon very tender ground[,] I would not be content with

109

On Blanchard see Page Life, Blanchard, William Isaac (bap. 1741?, d.
1796), in 6 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 152-53.
The author thanks John Gordan for the information about Blanchard.
110
See Transcript of Sayre v. Rochford Jury Instructions, Norfolk Record
Office, WLS XLIX/3/23.
111
In fact, the explanation was probably largely for the benefit of counsel,
presumably in case they wanted to object in order to reserve a point on error. See, e.g.,
id. fols. 1-2 (de Grey commented, “I am very glad I do this in the presence of the
Council [sic] on both sides who are almost all of them attend[in]g because I now call
upon them & desire that if in saying what I apprehend to be the Law they think I am
mistaken they will tell me so—and I shall be either able to change my opinion or put it
in a course of inquiry as may be fit and proper for Justice to the partys [sic].”).
112
Id. fol. 3.
113
See MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE
COMMISSION OF OYER AND TERMINER AND GOAL DELIVERY FOR THE TRIAL OF THE
REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762). De Grey owned the first edition. See Catalogue of the
Home Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/2, fol. 2.
114
Compare, e.g., de Grey’s wording in Transcript of Sayre v. Rochford Jury
Instructions, Norfolk Record Office, WLS XLIX/3/23, fols. 3-6, with FOSTER, supra note
113, at 193-96.

2009]

THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION

165

giving you my opinion without quoting it as the opinion of that great
Judge who was one of the best wishers to this Government that ever
sat upon the Bench.115

Foster was a “great Judge,” who earned the approbation of his
contemporaries, but he was also a modern writer whose
statement of the law appeared not in a particular case, nor in a
collection of case summaries, but in a discussion hung only at a
remove upon the authority of a judicial opinion, and yet de
Grey felt not only comfortable but compelled to cite him as an
authority.116
What these examples suggest is that the methods of
judicial education matter. If, for instance, the primary means of
training new judges comes from the dispensing of wisdom by
more experienced colleagues, then one might expect to see the
perpetuation of institutional traditions even beyond their
usefulness. On the other hand, if judges learned largely from
books, then the content of those books and the way they
organized and explained the law would color the judges’
understanding and influence their opinions.117 However, such
influence has not been ascribed to the sorts of practice manuals
and reference books de Grey purchased. Some of them have
been written off as no more than textbooks for students or
young lawyers.118 As a group they have been declared to have
had limited bearing on the development of the law in the
eighteenth century.119 The English legal historian, William
Holdsworth, claimed that barristers did not read practice
books.120 Perhaps attorneys, those lesser members of the legal
profession who filed papers and dealt with clients, read such
books.121 But the more elevated barristers who pleaded in court

115

Transcript of Sayre v. Rochford Jury Instructions, Norfolk Record Office,
WLS XLIX/3/23, fols. 5-6 (emphasis added).
116
12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 136 & n.6.
117
David Ibbetson, Legal Printing and Legal Doctrine, 35 IRISH JURIST 345,
345 (2000) (“[T]here is a close relationship between the way in which the law operates
and the sources that are available to the lawyers who operate it.”); Simpson, supra note
17, at 633 (arguing for a “close relation between the forms of legal literature and
lawyers’ ideas of what they are doing, and of the appropriate way for jurists to
behave.”).
118
Lobban, supra note 17, at 73 n.20.
119
Id. at 70; Simpson, supra note 17, at 639 (ignores practice books, and
claims that “abridgments and common-place books . . . remained dominant forms of
legal literature until the nineteenth century”).
120
6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 436-38.
121
See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25-28; 12 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 30, at 8-9.
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required skills, such as advocacy and examining witnesses,
that could only be learned in practice.122
But a judge needed more than courtroom skills.123 He
also needed to be familiar with those aspects of law and
procedure, of which, as a barrister, he might have had only
glancing knowledge. If he turned to books to acquire that
knowledge, then those books in part shaped him as a judge. In
de Grey’s case, the evidence is insufficient to determine how
the books he may have read formed his jurisprudence.
However, given how little is known about judicial education
historically, it is already a step forward even to identify the
sorts of books a judge used. That is the subject matter of Part
III.
III.

STAGE ONE OF CHIEF JUSTICE DE GREY’S JUDICIAL
EDUCATION

Preserved in the de Grey archives is a letter written on
Monday, January 21, 1771, addressed to William de Grey from
Lord North, the prime minister. It informs the then-attorney
general that, “Lord Chief Justice Wilmot having this evening
resign’d his office, I am commanded by his Majesty to inform
you that he has pitched upon you for his successor.”124 The
appointment was made official on Friday the twenty-fifth, and
the next day de Grey took the coif as a serjeant-at-law, as was
a prerequisite for all English common law judges, and was

122

See 6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 438 (1924) (“The art
of examining witnesses, and of presenting the facts in a manner favorable to his client,
was more important than a minute knowledge of how to put and keep in motion the
formal machinery of process.”).
123
Cf. Letter from William Blackstone to Lord Shelburne (July 29, 1762),
reprinted in THE LETTERS OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 1744-1780, at 93 (W.R. Prest
ed., 2006) (“My Ambition now rises to the Post of an English Judge; for which I hope
that my Studies have in some degree qualified me (else I should be ashamed to think of
it) though I fear that my natural Diffidence will never permit me to make any very
great Progress at the Bar; for which Talents very different are required than those . . .
that will qualify for the Bench.”).
124
Letter from Lord North to William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
XIII/9/3. The letter is not dated. It only indicates that it was written on “Monday
Night.” However, Wilmot’s resignation was made public by at least Thursday, January
24, 1771 and de Grey was sworn in on January 26, so the date of the letter can be
th
securely identified. 2 W. Bl. 734 (“[O]n January 24 , Sir John Eardley Wilmot (on
account of ill health) resigned his office . . . .”). The letter continues, “You will know
better than I do the steps that are proper to take upon this occasion; as Lord Chief
Justice Wilmot has actually resign’d, it will be right to proceed in them with all
convenient speed.”
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sworn in as chief justice of Common Pleas.125 At some point that
same Saturday he, or someone on his behalf, made a visit to
the bookshop of Barnes Tovey in Bell Yard, a few blocks from
de Grey’s house in Lincoln’s Inn Fields.126 From Tovey he
purchased Robert Richardson’s The Attorney’s Practice in the
Court of Common Pleas, a primer on Common Pleas procedure
ostensibly aimed at students and young clerks but apparently
also of use to neophyte judges.127
Between February 28 and November 16, 1771, according
to the receipt from Tovey reproduced on the next page, de Grey
bought five additional practical pleading or procedure manuals.
The question is how he used these books. Since he does not cite
the works in his judicial opinions and since none of his personal
copies have been located, this is impossible to answer with
certainty.128 However, the nature of the books themselves, the
order and timing of his purchases, and several additional
pieces of evidence concerning his book-buying habits generally
suggest that he bought the works in order to teach himself
about his new court and its procedure.
In all, de Grey obtained eight works from Tovey
between January 1771 and January 1772, six on pleading and
procedure and, at the end of the period, two others that did not
belong to his judicial self-education project: Francis Vesey’s
reports of Chancery cases from the years 1746-1755 and
volume three of James Burrow’s King’s Bench reports for the
years 1761-1766.129 He presumably bought these two reports to
add to an impressive collection that by 1781 included over
seventy nominate reports, ten volumes of the Year Books,
125

2 W. Bl. 734.
Receipt for Purchases at Barnes Tovey Bookshop, Norfolk Record Office,
WLS LV/10/25 (Jan. 20, 1772). On the location of Tovey’s bookshop in 1771, see the
title page to his edition of the Crown Circuit Companion, listing his shop at “the Dove,
in Bell-Yard, near Lincoln’s Inn.” W. STUBBS & G. TALMASH, CROWN CIRCUIT
COMPANION (London, J. Worrall & B. Tovey, 4th ed. 1768). De Grey lived in Lincoln’s
Inn Fields, just outside of Lincoln’s Inn. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 68, at 413.
127
Lobban, supra note 17, at 73 n.20.
128
According to de Grey’s descendant, the ninth Baron Walsingham (de Grey
was the first baron), the library remained in the family intact until it was dispersed
through a sale in the late 1960s or early 1970s. No catalogue or record of the sale has
been located. E-mail from Lord John Walsingham to Emily Kadens, Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Texas at Austin (July 22, 2008, 21:15 CST) (on file with author).
129
See 3 JAMES BURROW, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF
KING’S BENCH SINCE THE TIME OF LORD MANSFIELD’S COMING TO PRESIDE IN IT
(London, J. Worrall & B. Tovey, 2d ed. 1771); FRANCIS VESEY, CASES ARGUED AND
DETERMINED, IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY, IN THE TIME OF LORD CHANCELLOR
HARDWICKE, FROM THE YEAR 1746-7, TO 1755 (London, T. Cadell 1771).
126

168

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

assorted other collections of cases, and seventeen volumes of
reports in manuscript.130 Burrow and Vesey both reported
decisions from important judges, respectively Lord Mansfield
and Chancellor Hardwicke, so it is no surprise that de Grey
would have wanted to own the works. Furthermore, the timing
of the purchases can likely be accounted for at least in part by
the fact that both volumes were published in 1771, the Vesey in
January and the Burrow as a second edition put out by Tovey
and his partner John Worrall in mid-November, just a few days
before de Grey obtained it.131

Receipt for the Purchase of Law Books. Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/10/25,
428X2. Reprinted by courtesy of the Norfolk Record Office, Norwich, England.

130

Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
L/4/1, fols. 1, 2-4; Catalogue of Home Library of William de Grey, WLS L/4/2, fol. 7.
131
See Advertisement for the Burrow Volume, PUB. ADVERTISER, Nov. 11,
1771, at 1. The Vesey volumes appear to have been published in January 1771 by
Thomas Cadell. The price listed in the advertisement is the same as that paid by de
Grey in January 1772. See Advertisement for the Vesey Volume, PUB. ADVERTISER,
June 6, 1771, at 1; Advertisement for the Vesey Volume, PUB. ADVERTISER, Jan. 31,
1771, at 3.

2009]

THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION

169

That leaves the six works on procedure. These fall
neatly into two types. In one category are three basic
procedural primers, aimed primarily at solicitors. In the second
category are three more works that, due to tradition or the
esteem in which their authors were held, had acquired
sufficient authority to be cited in court. Nonetheless, these still
had the characteristics of textbooks or reference manuals,
albeit respectable ones.
A.

Procedural Primers

To begin with the category of procedural primers, as
mentioned above, de Grey acquired the first book on the list,
Richardson’s Attorney’s Practice in the Common Pleas, the day
he became a judge.132 One month later, on February 28, two
weeks after the end of his first term,133 he purchased Joseph
Harrison’s Present Practice of the Court of Common Pleas.134
The two books are virtually indistinguishable. Indeed, the
Harrison was largely a bowdlerized version of the Richardson.
They would have been ideal introductory or refresher
“nutshells” for a new judge who had spent most of the prior two
decades in Chancery and eight years serving in high
government offices far removed from mundane common law
practice.
Practice books such as these two appear to have been
directed at the paper-filing attorneys rather than barristers. As
such, they focused on the practical procedure of the courts,
pleading technique, fee structures, and model forms.135 Such
information was of obvious use to de Grey, for, although he had
practiced a certain amount in King’s Bench (though, of course,
not Common Pleas), he was unlikely to have retained an
intimate knowledge of whatever arcane details of common law
procedure that he might once have mastered.
Perhaps even more usefully, the long initial chapter in
each work described the officers and machinery of the Court.
This served two purposes for de Grey. First, it was a quick
introduction—conveniently including name, position, and job
132

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
Hilary term ended on February 12. See PUB. ADVERTISER, Jan. 29, 1771, at 3.
134
See Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office,
WLS L/4/1, fol. 7. He also bought Harrison’s PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF
KING’S BENCH; both Harrison volumes were published in 1761. The Richardson edition
he purchased was published in 1769. See id.
135
6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 122, at 437-48.
133
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description—to his Court employees. Obtaining this
information furthered a crucial element of his socialization,
namely, learning his way around the organization.136 Second,
more crassly, the chapters informed him which of the Court’s
bureaucratic positions were under his patronage, this being a
significant source of a chief’s income.137
The case reports provide an inkling that de Grey needed
to upgrade his knowledge of procedure. In two early cases, he
demonstrated himself to be a bit at sea with the procedural
question before the Court. In Long v. Linch, heard during de
Grey’s first term, the plaintiff had sued the defendant for a
debt, and in order to hold defendant to bail, had filed an
affidavit.138 Defendant argued that plaintiff should have made a
positive oath of the debt, and that an affidavit “only of mere
inference and conclusion” was insufficient.139 Gould and Nares
disagreed.140 Blackstone dissented, probably correctly.141
Blackstone records de Grey as “dubitante.”142 The following
term, in April 1771, Common Pleas heard a habeas corpus
petition by the Lord Mayor of London, Brass Crosby, who had
been ordered imprisoned by the Speaker of the House of
Commons for violating the parliamentary privilege of a House
officer.143 The wily serjeants who argued the case ex parte on
behalf of the Mayor initiated the proceedings by moving to
have the return of the writ read then tried to maneuver the
court into admitting that errors in the return should result in
their client’s discharge.144 De Grey became quite embroiled in
the dispute, demanding to see the writ and the return, which
136

See Wasby, supra note 2, at 10 (“[New judges] must learn to deal with
court staff, both lawyers and non-lawyers—in short, the court bureaucracy.”).
137
DUMAN, supra note 10, at 112, 120.
138
Long v. Linch, (1771) 2 W. Bl. 740, 740.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 740 & n.p (Elsley ed., 1828) (reviewing the development of the case
law on the issue).
142
Id. at 740. Wilson’s report of the case has de Grey agreeing with the
majority. Long v. Linch, 3 Wils. 154, 154.
143
The situation arose when Norton issued a warrant for the arrest of John
Miller, printer of the London Evening Post, for printing the debates of the House of
Commons. In the 1771 “Printers’ Case,” Parliament and the London printers disputed
the right to print the debates of the House of Commons, with the House asserting its
privilege of secrecy of debate. The background to the Common Pleas case is described
in ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY 277-85
(2006). See also G. F. R. Barker, rev. S. J. Skedd, Crosby, Brass (1725-1793), in 14
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 410.
144
Postscript, MIDDLESEX J., Apr. 20, 1771, at 3.
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“he perused . . . with great attention.”145 Gould and Blackstone
eventually had to steer the neophyte chief out of trouble and
move the case beyond the procedural hurdle.146
The fifth purchase de Grey made from Tovey, on July
11, was also an attorney’s practice book, but this time the work,
The Crown Circuit Companion,147 concerned trial procedure on
circuit rather than the procedure of the Court sitting en banc in
Westminster. According to newspaper reports, de Grey left for
his first assize three days after buying the book.148
He may have made this purchase because he felt some
trepidation about sitting on assize. He would have had little
recent circuit experience, as he likely had not gone a full assize
circuit as a barrister for many years. For one thing, Chancery
barristers often could not go on assize because Chancery did
not cease its work during the months when the common law
courts in Westminster shut down so that the judges could go on
circuit.149 Second, the solicitor general and attorney general
generally did not go on circuit. In a big trial, they might be
called in on the brief, but then they would not have had to
occupy themselves with routine or technical matters.150

145

Id.
Id.; see also Pole v. Jonson, (1771) 2 W. Bl. 774, 766 (heard during de
Grey’s third term, in which he gave the opinion of the Court and was promptly put in
his place by his three puisnes, who announced that, though they “agreed, that the
judgment should be for the defendant, [they] thought the rule laid down by the Chief
Justice too lax and general, and introductive of infinite litigations”).
147
W. STUBBS & G. TALMASH, THE CROWN CIRCUIT COMPANION; CONTAINING
THE PRACTICE OF THE ASSISES ON THE CROWN SIDE, AND OF THE COURTS OF GENERAL
AND GENERAL QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE: WHEREIN IS INCLUDED, A COLLECTION
OF USEFUL AND MODERN PRECEDENTS OF INDICTMENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES; AS WELL AT
COMMON LAW, AS THOSE CREATED BY STATUTE (London, J. Worrall & B. Tovey 4th ed.
1768).
148
London, GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER, July 13, 1771, at 2; Norfolk
Gaol Book, National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 37 (listing de Grey and Adams as hearing
suits). De Grey apparently did not go the Lent 1771 circuit. Although the Middlesex
Journal of March 2, at page 1, reported that de Grey had set out for the Norfolk circuit
during the Lent assize of 1771, he is not listed in the assize record for the circuit, and
on March 6, the Public Advertiser noted at page 2 that, “Lord Chief Justice De Grey is
at this Time so severely afflicted with the Gout as to be incapable of all Business.” See
Norfolk Gaol Book, National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 15 (listing Adams and Serjeant
Whitaker as hearing cases). However, de Grey’s papers do include an account for this
assize. Accounts for Lent Assize 1771, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/9/14. This might
just reflect the share of the cut he received as Chief Justice.
149
LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 184.
150
1 TWISS, supra note 15, at 189 (“It is usual for a barrister, advanced to the
rank of a law officer of the Crown, to quit his circuit and confine himself to the business
of London, except when taken on special retainer to lead some particular cause at the
assizes.”).
146
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To assuage his anxiety, de Grey presumably could rely
on two sources of education. First, he went the circuit with Sir
Richard Adams, baron of the Exchequer.151 Adams had been
appointed to the bench in 1753, making him at that time one of
the longest-serving central court judges and therefore perhaps
a very good person to mentor the neophyte.152 However, on
circuit the judges presided individually, usually with one judge
hearing the civil suits and the other concurrently hearing the
criminal cases.153 Thus, de Grey was on his own in open court,
which might explain why, shortly before the assize, he bought a
reference book.
The Companion was part description of the circuit
proceedings, part form book, and part fee schedule. The first
section of the work briefed the reader on the details of the
assize trial process: when things happened, which court officers
did and said what, which forms had to be filed at different
points in the process and what they said, and similar steps in
the process. This was followed by model indictments for dozens
of crimes and then an explanation of which fees were received
by each court officer. If de Grey wanted to remind himself
about the most basic choreography of the assize he could have
obtained that information from this book. And if he wanted to
look over the forms of indictments or the criminal procedure, he
could do that too. This might have been especially useful for
him because he had probably seen little routine criminal law
since he had been a young barrister, if he had even then.
In his Commentaries, Blackstone indicated that books
like the Harrison, the Richardson, and the Companion had a
genuine role to play in teaching about court procedure. He
instructed those students who wished to gain a deeper
knowledge of procedure that “[a] book or two of technical
learning will also be found very convenient . . . . These books of
practice, as they are called, are all pretty much on a level in
point of composition and solid instruction; so that which bears
the latest edition is usually the best.”154 De Grey had certainly
151

Norfolk Gaol Book, National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 37.
According to de Grey’s predecessor as Chief Justice, Sir John Eardley
Wilmot, Adams “was a very good Lawyer, and an excellent Judge, having every quality
necessary to dignify that character: I never saw him out of humour in my life, and I
knew him intimately for forty years.” JOHN WILMOT, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR JOHN EARDLEY WILMOT, KNT. 199-200 (London, White &
Cochrane 2d ed. 1811) (internal quotations omitted).
153
1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 134-35.
154
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *271 n.(a).
152

2009]

THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION

173

known Blackstone before joining the bench, for they had been
in Parliament together and had been opposing counsel on
several cases in the 1760s.155 De Grey must also have known
that Blackstone, author of the already famous Commentaries
on the Laws of England, knew books.156 Indeed, only three years
earlier, in the third volume of the Commentaries, Blackstone
had published his own well-regarded 155-page mini-treatise on
(primarily) Common Pleas procedure.157 Thus, one might
wonder whether, upon joining the Court, de Grey had sought
from Blackstone advice about useful reference books and
whether Blackstone had given the Chief the same advice about
practice manuals that he had offered to his students.
B.

Authoritative Works

Two of the books de Grey bought that fell into the
second category, that of works authoritative enough to be cited
in court, concerned pleading. Pleading had, in the previous
centuries, become an excessively technical system, and one
which skillful advocates could use to prevent the court from
getting to the merits.158 As a Chancery barrister, this was
probably yet another common law skill at which de Grey was
pretty rusty. The extent to which he felt it important to learn
about pleading can be seen in the information provided on
Tovey’s receipt about de Grey’s third purchase, on March 25, of
volume five of John Comyns’s Digest of the Laws of England.
The Digest was a popular legal encyclopedia, in which the rules
of law and the relevant cases and statutes were collected under
alphabetically-organized general headings and subheadings.
The work had originally been written in French but was
translated into English and published posthumously in five
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In Lowe v. Joliffe, (1762) 1 W. Bl. 365 (K.B.), Blackstone was on the brief
for plaintiff, de Grey for the defendant; in Baskett v. Cunningham, (1762) 1 W. Bl. 370
(Ch.), de Grey was on the brief for the plaintiff, Blackstone for the defendant; in
Torriano v. Legge, (1763) 1 W. Bl. 420 (Exch.), Blackstone was on brief for the plaintiff,
de Grey for defendant; and in King v. University of Cambridge, (1765) 1 W. Bl. 547
(K.B.), de Grey moved for plaintiff in his role as solicitor general, Blackstone was on
the brief for the University. Obviously there may have been other cases, but these are
the cases that a search of the published reports turns up.
156
WILFRID R. PREST, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: LAW AND LETTERS IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 220-21 (2008) (discussing reception of the Commentaries).
157
Id. at 221; see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *270-425.
158
9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 308-10, 314-15 (3d ed.
1926) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY].
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volumes between 1762 and 1767.159 De Grey owned the first
edition of the whole five-volume set, and, given the importance
of the Comyns as a reference, he probably had added it to his
library as soon as it came out.160
In purchasing only volume five in 1771, de Grey had
something special in mind. He bought the volume unbound (“in
sheets”) and then had the 300-page-long first heading or title,
“Pleader,” separately bound in vellum.161 Comyns (c. 16671740), a serjeant practicing before Common Pleas, and later a
judge on that Court and on Exchequer, had been particularly
knowledgeable about the rules of pleading.162 The title “Pleader”
was “exceptionally well developed” and authoritative.163 The
Comyns also was, as a dense, encyclopedic compendium of case
law on every conceivable issue that could arise on a given legal
subject, very much a reference manual.164 The fact that de Grey
went to the expense of possibly purchasing a duplicate of a
volume he already owned and of having the single title
separately bound, indicates that he believed this was a
reference work to which he would be referring repeatedly,
either for its own information or as an index to the relevant
case law.165

159

M. Macnair, Comyns, Sir John (c. 1667-1740), in 12 OXFORD DICTIONARY
supra note 19, at 910-11.
160
Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
L/4/1, fol. 1. There is no record of his purchasing the whole set while on the bench.
161
Read the receipt: “Doing up [the] Title, ‘Pleader,’ of Ditto in Vellum.”
Interestingly, the Cambridge bookseller, John Woodyer, hired to make a list of de
Grey’s law books in November 1781, soon after de Grey retired from the bench, did not
understand what the Pleader volume was. The catalogue lists the book as “The Pleader
a Law Book unfinishd [sic] & without a Title.” Catalogue of Law Library of William de
Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, cover page & fol. 1.
162
M. Macnair, Comyns, Sir John (c. 1667-1740), in 12 OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 910.
163
Id. at 911; see W.S. HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH
LAW 118-19 (1925) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES]; 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY,
supra note 158, at 312 (quoting Serjeant Stephen calling the Comyns title on pleader “a
more systematic compilation upon this subject than had previously appeared” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
164
Baloch, supra note 93, at 420 (quoting a letter from an eighteenth-century
law clerk stating that reading the Comyns “would prove but a dull task as he does not
preserve a connected style and besides might give you a distaste for study” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
165
The library catalogue does not indicate whether volume five of the set was
incomplete, and there is no mention of an additional volume five. However, the Pleader
volume is listed in the catalogue immediately before the Comyns is listed, so they were
likely shelved together. Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record
Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol. 1. It is possible that de Grey bought a new volume five just so
that he could have the title “Pleader” bound as a separate reference work.
OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY,
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The last book on de Grey’s list, acquired on November
16, 1771, also concerned pleading. The anonymous A System of
Pleading consisted of the first English translation, reworking,
and updating of a well-known seventeenth-century law French
work by Samson Eure called the Doctrina Placitandi, or the art
and science of pleading.166 The English legal historian, William
Holdsworth, noted that the Doctrina Placitandi was “[o]ne of
the earliest” systematic works on pleading,167 and in 1759 John
Willes, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, announced in court that
there was “more law and learning in Doctrina Placitandi than
in any book he knew.”168 De Grey did not seem to own the
Doctrina, and he may have bought the System of Pleading
when he did because it had been published in July 1771.169
However, coupled with the Comyns, the purchase suggests that
this clear and informative overview on the method and tactics
of successful pleading could have been standing in for the sort
of oral instruction Justice Denison gave to Mansfield and
Ryder. De Grey may have had nowhere else to turn. Gould had
been an apparently quite average barrister;170 Blackstone was
renowned as a weak advocate;171 and Nares, though an
experienced courtroom lawyer, may not have impressed de
Grey with his judicial abilities.172
On June 25, de Grey purchased his fourth book,
Geoffrey Gilbert’s The History and Practice of Civil Actions,
Particularly in the Court of Common Pleas.173 The Gilbert was a
standard work by an eighteenth-century judge and prolific
writer of elementary texts, whose posthumously-published
treatises enjoyed great popularity.174 It was, as Blackstone said,
“a book of a very different stamp [from other practice books];
it . . . traced out the reason of many parts of our modern
166

SAMSON EURE, DOCTRINA PLACITANDI, OU L’ART & SCIENCE DE BON
PLEADING (London, Robert Pawlet 1677).
167
HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES, supra note 163, at 118.
168
White v. Willis, (1759) 2 Wils. 87, 88 (K.B.).
169
See LONDON EVENING POST, June 22, 1771, at 4 (printing advertisements
announcing the forthcoming publication of the System of Pleading); see also LONDON
EVENING POST, July 6, 1771, at 4 (announcing the publication).
170
See supra notes 89-90.
171
See Kadens, supra note 89.
172
See supra note 60.
173
De Grey purchased the second edition published in 1761. The first edition
appeared in 1737. Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office,
WLS L/4/1, fol. 7.
174
Michael Macnair, Sir Jeffrey Gilbert and His Treatises, 15 J. LEGAL HIST.
252, 258, 260-61 (1994).
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practice, from the feudal institutions and the primitive
construction of our courts, in a most clear and ingenious
manner.”175 This historical approach may have appealed to de
Grey, whose library and opinions demonstrate his interest in
history.176 But on another level, the Gilbert may have offered to
de Grey, an interloper of sorts in the Common Pleas, a means
to a greater sense of legitimacy. By learning about the history
of the Court and the development of its procedure, he could also
place himself in that story. It made him less of an outsider and
helped him understand the reason for the procedures he was
now obligated to continue. In the parlance of modern studies of
judicial education, he was socializing himself to his new role by
seeking “to find some sense of fit with the court organization.”177
More pragmatically, the Gilbert was worth having
because it was a respectable enough authority to be cited in
court. Justice Blackstone referred to the book in an opinion in
1775 to state a rule on venue;178 and defense counsel in 1772
relied on it for a rule concerning the actions that could be
joined in a single declaration.179 Defense counsel also used the
book in 1776 alongside more traditional authorities such as
Brooke’s and Rolle’s Abridgments to make a point about local
custom;180 and in the same term plaintiff’s counsel adduced it as
the source of a rule about the proper place to make a plea to
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3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *271 n.(a).
De Grey owned a remarkable variety of historical works, ranging from
William Wotton’s History of Rome (1701), to David Jones’s Compleat History of the
Turks (1701), to Michel Le Vassor’s ten-volume Histoire du regne de Louis XIII, roi de
France et de Navarre (1760), to, of course, Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the Common
Law (1739). Catalogue of the Home Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office,
WLS LV/4/2, fols. 13, 24; Catalogue of the Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk
Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol. 8 (Hale). His opinions, too, demonstrate an interest in
history where that was called for. In Wood’s Case, 2 W. Bl. 745, 745, heard during his
first month on the bench, he “expressed his Surprize” at the claim that Common Pleas
had no jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus at common law. To answer this
assertion, de Grey examined the legal history, using cases and treatises, to
demonstrate the origin of this belief and to prove its falsity. In Rowning v. Goodchild,
(1773) 2 W. Bl. 906, 908-09, he deployed historical sources to interpret the meaning of
the word “delivery” in one of the early statutes related to the post office. And in Bolts v.
Purvis, (1775) 2 W. Bl. 1023, 1026-27, he examined the history of the law governing the
East-India trade. Another case in which de Grey used historical analysis was Barker v.
Braham, (1773) 2 W. Bl. 869, 871 (history of law of set off).
177
Alpert, Atkins & Ziller, supra note 2, at 329-30; Wasby, supra note 2, at 10
(“Appellate judges must become acclimated to their jobs. They must . . . learn formal
rules of the court and its informal norms, including the court’s history and traditions.”).
178
Santler v. Heard, (1775) 2 W. Bl. 1031, 1033.
179
Mast v. Goodson, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 848, 849.
180
Mayor of Berwick v. Ewart, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1068, 1069.
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the jurisdiction.181 In other words, this was a book with which
de Grey was going to come into contact in court, which
increases the likelihood that he bought it to read or consult.
Furthermore, the fact that de Grey did not already own such a
standard work is arguably evidence of how little he had
concerned himself with Common Pleas procedure prior to his
elevation to the bench.
C.

Evidence of Self-Study

Although, based on his library catalogues, de Grey
appears to have had a lifelong habit of collecting books on
subjects about which his schooling, career, or merely personal
interest demanded that he be familiar, it is unlikely that he
purchased the books on Tovey’s receipt from mere bibliophilic
interest.182 First, he kept them in his law library with what was
evidently his active reference collection. Second, the other
additions he made to his law library during his tenure on the
bench did not have the coherence of the 1771 acquisitions.
Between de Grey’s accounts and his library catalogues, several
purchases can be identified. He added three volumes of reports
on King’s Bench and Exchequer, the 1772 second edition of
Henry Barnes’s Notes of Cases in Points of Practice Taken in
the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, John Lilly’s
Practical Register, the 1777 edition of Joseph Sayer’s Law of
Costs to go with the 1768 first edition he also owned, and a
volume of the laws of the province of Quebec.183 While on the
bench, de Grey may also have obtained the first edition of
181

Grant v. Lord Sondes, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1094, 1095.
See VIRGINIA F. STERN, GABRIEL HARVEY: HIS LIFE, MARGINALIA AND
LIBRARY 194 (1979) (“The titles in an individual’s library are usually an excellent
indicator of his interests.”).
183
King’s Bench reports by Sayer (1775), Catalogue of Law Library of William
de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol. 2; the just-published volume four of
Burrow’s King’s Bench reports, Record of Purchase, Burrow’s Reports, Norfolk Record
Office, WLS LV/13/14 (June 24, 1776); Exchequer Reports by Chief Baron Parker
(1776), Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
LV/4/1, fol. 2; Barnes’s Notes, Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk
Record Office, WLS L/4/1, fol. 6; the 1735 edition of Lilly’s Practical Register, Record of
Purchase, Lilly’s Practical Register, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/14/13 (Jan. 15,
1777); Sayer’s Law of Costs (1777), Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey,
Norfolk Record Office, WLS L/4/1, fol. 6. He appears to have had a special interest in
Quebec. Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
L/4/1, fol. 1. He had three more such volumes in his home library (a work on the custom
of the French in the Province of Quebec also published in 1772 and two copies of a
“Code of Laws for Quebeck” published in 1774). Catalogue of Home Library of William
de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS L/4/2, fols. 3, 22.
182
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Blackstone’s Commentaries that he kept in his law library.184
Finally, as will be discussed at length in the next section, in
1772, he bought Buller’s Law of Trials at Nisi Prius.
The third piece of evidence suggesting that de Grey
bought the procedural works in 1771 as part of a methodical
campaign to educate himself in the practice of Common Pleas
is the fact that he did not immediately acquire the standard
collections of Common Pleas cases. Coming in, case law was
probably not his foremost concern. As the twentieth-century
Canadian judge, Edson Haines, said in an article on judicial
education:
[S]ubstantive law will be recalled and learned as [the new judge]
matures on the bench. He can take time to consider this and
refurbish his knowledge. He cannot postpone the learning of the
rules by which causes are tried and evidence admitted. The
guarantees of a fair trial are found in the laws of procedure and
evidence.185

As an experienced barrister, de Grey must have had a nearly
encyclopedic knowledge of cases, albeit predominantly those
decided in King’s Bench.186 He owned the primary seventeenth
and early eighteenth-century Common Pleas reports as well as
a collection of (unidentifiable) manuscript reports, but the
records give no indication of when he obtained them, and none
of the receipts or accounts from the 1770s records the purchase
184

According to his library catalogues, he eventually possessed two complete
sets of the Commentaries. In his law library, he had the first edition of 1765-1769.
Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol.
6. At home he had the pirated Dublin 1775 edition. Catalogue of Home Library of
William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/2, fol. 20. However, his papers also
contain two receipts for the purchase of the Commentaries. One, from February 12,
1777, notes that he “paid Mr. Chamberlayne for Blackstone Commtries 0:6:6;” and the
second records a purchase from the publisher in 1774. Record of Purchase, Lilly’s
Practical Register, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/14/13 (Jan. 15, 1777); Record of
Purchase, Blackstone’s Commentaries, WLS LV/12/11 (May 17, 1774); see also Record
of Payment, Binding of Blackstone’s Commentaries 1774, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
LV/12/21 (July 5, 1774); Record of Payment, Binding of Blackstone’s Commentaries,
Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/14/20 (June 4, 1777). The question is to which editions
these receipts refer, if either.
185
Haines, supra note 13, at 233.
186
He was also said to have possessed an excellent memory. 1 TWISS, supra
note 15, at 113 (Lord Eldon said he had a “‘most extraordinary power of memory.’—
‘Lord Chief Justice De Grey,’ said Lord Eldon, ‘was a severe sufferer from gout. I have
seen him come into court with both hands wrapped in flannel. He could not take a note,
and had no one to do so for him. I have known him try a cause that lasted nine or ten
hours, and then, from memory, sum up all the evidence with the greatest correctness. I
have known counsel interrupt him in his summing up, and represent that he had misstated evidence. ‘I am right,’ he would say, ‘I am sure I am right; refer to your shorthand writer’s notes.’ He invariably proved to be correct.’”).
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of Common Pleas reports.187 Yet he did not include in his 1771
buying spree either the first edition of Henry Barnes’s Notes on
Common Pleas cases or George Cooke’s Reports and Cases of
Practice in the Court of Common Pleas, both of which were
cited regularly by the serjeants in oral argument. At some
point de Grey did acquire the second, expanded edition of the
Barnes, though there is no record in his accounts of the
purchase, and it is possible he received it as a gift from the
author, who was an officer of the Court.188 The Cooke, however,
never appeared in either his purchase receipts or his library
catalogues.
De Grey may not have worried a great deal about
knowing the Common Pleas precedents for two reasons. First,
counsel and the judges often cited King’s Bench cases in their
argument and opinions.189 This may have been due to King’s
Bench’s greater prestige, or it may simply have been a result of
the comparative lack of published Common Pleas reports.190
Second, the judges and barristers worked together to find the
relevant cases and discussed them at the hearings, so that any
lacunae in de Grey’s knowledge could have been addressed in
this give and take.191
However, when presiding on circuit, de Grey could not
dodge substantive questions, so after squaring away his
187

Catalogue of Home Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office,
WLS L/4/2, fol. 7 (“Seventeen Vols of Reports in MS”—notably, kept in his home
library).
188
Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS
L/4/1, fol. 6 (listing the Barnes in the law library catalogue). Barnes was a Secondary
and Clerk of Errors in the Court of Common Pleas.
189
Looking at the twelve cases from Blackstone’s Reports in which de Grey is
recorded as giving the greatest number of citations, references to King’s Bench cases
outnumber those to Common Pleas by more than two to one. The cases sampled were:
Wood’s Case, (1771) 2 W. Bl. 745, 745; Atkinson v. Teasdale, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 817, 81820; Hitchin v. Campbell, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 827, 829-32; Parsons v. Lloyd, (1772) 2 W. Bl.
845, 846-47; Powel v. Milbank, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 851, 852-53; Murray v. Harding, (1773)
2 W. Bl. 859, 862-86; Barker v. Braham (1773) 2 W. Bl. 866, 867-69; Doe d. Wightwick
v. Truby, (1774) 2 W. Bl. 944, 946-47; Abbott v. Smith, (1774) 2 W. Bl. 947, 949-51;
Hawkins v. Plomer, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1048, 1049-50; Miller v. Seare, (1777) 2 W. Bl.
1140, 1144-46; Cameron v. Lightfoot, (1778) 2 W. Bl. 1190, 1192-95.
190
Oldham, Underreported and Underrated, supra note 50, at 119-21. De Grey
also seems to have known many decisions from the 1740s and early 1750s by John
Willes, Chief Justice of Common Pleas from 1737-1761, because he cites them in the
annotations to his Buller’s Nisi Prius.
191
Counsel seems to have been expected to produce case reports at argument.
See, for example, the statement of counsel in the trial of Fabrigas v. Mostyn (1773), in
11 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 169 (Francis Hargrave ed., 4th ed. 1781) (“I
have Sir Bartholomew Shower’s parliamentary cases upon the table.”).
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knowledge of pleading and procedure, he turned to the rules of
law. The next Part examines how he did this.
IV.

STAGE TWO: CREATING A BENCH BOOK

One of the educational services the Federal Judicial
Center provides to new federal judges is a bench book tailored
to the law and procedure of their type of court and distributed
in a three-ring binder to facilitate updating and
supplementing.192 Even judges who do not need to make use of
the supplied bench book end up writing their own checklists,
notes, and cheat-sheets.193 Not having the benefit of a pre-made
guidebook to the job of a Common Pleas judge, de Grey created
his own. And much like modern judges might do with the
supplied bench book, he began with a printed text and built
onto it an extensive structure of additions and annotations that
would make the final work useful to him. His choice of base
text was the 1772 edition of the Introduction to the Law
Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius, by Francis Buller, a precocious,
brilliant, and successful young barrister who would soon
become the youngest judge to be appointed to the Court of
King’s Bench.194
That work, popular enough to be published repeatedly
until 1817,195 contained a summary of the law encountered at
civil trials on assize (so-called nisi prius trials). It consisted of
seven parts covering, first, injuries to the person, to personal
property, and to real property, then a long section on actions on
contract, followed by a series of brief accounts of actions given
by statute, criminal prosecutions relative to civil rights, and
traverses to land titles and stays of proceedings in lower
courts.196 The last two parts concerned trial practice, with an
192

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
(5th ed. 2007) (“[T]he purpose of . . . the Benchbook . . . is to provide a quick, practical
guide to help judges with situations they are likely to encounter on the bench . . . . New
judges in particular should benefit from the Benchbook . . . .”).
193
Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 383. I thank Judge Sam Sparks (W.D.
Tex.) and Judge Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tex.) for discussing with me the material they
created when they took the bench.
194
LEMAN THOMAS REDE, STRICTURES ON THE LIVES AND CHARACTERS OF THE
MOST EMINENT LAWYERS OF THE PRESENT DAY 108-09 (London, G. Kearsley 1790);
James Oldham, Buller, Sir Francis, First Baronet (1746-1800), in 8 OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 617-18.
195
James Oldham, Buller, Sir Francis, First Baronet (1746-1800), in 8
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 617-18.
196
See FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS
AT NISI PRIUS (London, C. Bathurst 1772). The “Actions given by Statute” include
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extensive treatment of evidence preceding a miscellany of
“General Matters relative to Trials.”
The Nisi Prius was the logical book for de Grey to
choose. Buller described it in the preface to his sixth edition as
“a vade mecum on the circuits,” intended to provide
practitioners with a mobile law library containing much of
what they needed to get through assize trials.197 At least some
late eighteenth-century lawyers took him at his word. Copies
survive with blank pages interleaved with the text and bound
in leather with large flaps that tied over the book to protect the
pages and keep out the dust of the road. On the blank pages
the owners made notes on existing precedent, added new law,
and reported on trials they attended.198 For them, the Buller
was a storage site for nisi prius law. On the other hand, Isaac
Espinasse, who later wrote a competing guide to nisi prius law,
took issue with the claim that Buller’s work was an aid for
experienced practitioners. Instead, he said, “it was certainly
used by the younger part of the Profession for a very different
purpose: it was used by them as an Elementary Book on the
Law of Nisi Prius, as a necessary Volume of preparatory legal
information.”199 For de Grey, the Buller may have served as
both elementary guide and reference library. Either way, he
made the book his own. In a manner far more extensive than
the interleaved lawyers’ copies and unusually invasive of the
author’s text, de Grey reconstructed Buller’s book, adding
pages of new material and hundreds of marginal annotations to
turn his own copy into something quite different from the
original.
By the time he purchased the Buller around December
1772,200 Chief Justice de Grey had presided over at most two
assizes in the country and several sets of trials for London.201
actions upon the statute of hue and cry, id. at 180-83, and actions on the statute of 5
Eliz. governing apprenticeships, id. at 188-90. The section on “criminal Prosecutions
relative to Civil Rights” concerns writs of mandamus and quo warranto. Id. at 195-209.
Traverses to land titles was a method of proving possession of land against the King.
197
FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT
NISI PRIUS, at first page of the unpaginated “Advertisement” (London, R. Pheney
1793).
198
BAKER & TAUSSIG, supra note 94, at 80, 106 (mss. 217, 218, 278).
199
ISAAC ESPINASSE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS AND TRIALS AT NISI
PRIUS, at vi (London, T. Cadell 2d ed. 1793).
200
See infra note 243 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dating.
201
He did not go on the Lent 1772 circuit according to the Norfolk Gaol Book,
National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 63, even though he was scheduled to go, MIDDLESEX
J., Feb. 4, 1772, at 3. For Summer 1772, he was scheduled for the Midland Circuit.
GEN. EVENING POST, June 25, 1772, at 1.
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Thus, although he did not yet have a great deal of trial
experience, he presumably had some idea of the sorts of law he
would encounter and the sorts of reference material that would
be helpful to have at hand. He knew, for instance, that
presiding over a trial, especially on assize, was different from
hearing a case en banc in Westminster. Sitting en banc, de
Grey had the assistance of his brethren.202 Gould had more
experience on the bench; Nares, the former serjeant, had spent
a career practicing before Common Pleas; Blackstone had the
authorities at his fingertips.203 And if the Chief was unsure
about the law or the cases, he could adjourn the hearing until
the judges had time to research and consider the issue.204 At
assize trials, by contrast, de Grey sat alone. He had to make
decisions immediately, in open court, before a jury, and in the
face of aggressive and compelling arguments by counsel.205 He
would often have to hear many cases in a row, had less time to
prepare for them, and did so with access to fewer books.206 He
could not carry a load of law books with him on the road, and
provincial cities could not always provide the books a judge

202

Bernard v. Bishop of Winchester, (1774) Lofft 401, 415 (C.B.) (“Lord Chief
Justice De Grey—I find, on conferring, we agree in opinion, and will give no further
trouble, though we are always glad to hear you.” (second emphasis added)); Tyssen v.
Clarke, (1774) 3 Wils. 541, 548-50 (K.B.) (trial at bar, heard en banc, all four judges
giving opinion on objection regarding admissibility of evidence).
203
See supra note 89.
204
See, e.g., Parsons v. Lloyd, (1772), Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn
Library, Hill MS 15, fol. 30 (“Serj[ean]t Glynn not ready in his Cases so Per Curiam: It
requires looking into the Cases.”).
205
See, e.g., THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CAUSE ON THE ACTION
BROUGHT BY THE RT. HON. GEO. ONSLOW, ESQ. AGAINST THE REV. MR. HORNE 31-41
(best evidence rule), 43-48 (variance in declaration) (Joseph Gurney ed., London, T.
Davies & J. Gurney 1770) (recording the aggressive arguments made by counsel to
Blackstone, J. in Onslow v. Horne, heard at the lent assize in 1770).
206
In Westminster, judges were supposed to receive papers from counsel
containing the pleadings in the case several days before it was heard. 1 ROBERT
RICHARDSON, THE ATTORNEY’S PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 190, 192,
201-02 (London, J. Worrall 1769) (attorneys must deliver copies of the issue or
demurrer book to the judges several days in advance of the hearing). The issue book
consisted of the pleadings, procedural history, and any jury verdict. STEPHEN, supra
note 69, at 103-04; see also 1 SYLVESTER DOUGLAS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH IN THE NINETEENTH, TWENTIETH, AND
TWENTY-FIRST YEARS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III, at xii (London, T. Cadell & E.
Brooke, 2d ed., 1786) (mentioning briefs of counsel). On assize, the judge presumably
also received the pleadings in advance, but it is unclear how much in advance. See the
letter of William Blackstone to Lady Blackstone, (Mar. 29, 1775) in THE LETTERS OF
SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 151 (“I have 20 Causes at this place,
none of them of considerable Length. Three are tried already, & the rest will be
finished with Ease on Friday Morning, or perhaps Thursday Night.”).
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might require.207 What de Grey needed was a compact reference
book, an encyclopedia of nisi prius law.
To turn Buller’s Nisi Prius into that encyclopedia, de
Grey had to do some significant reengineering, and because
only half of de Grey’s copy of the Nisi Prius is extant,
reconstructing his steps takes some guesswork. The 1772
edition that de Grey bought consisted of an unbound 330-page
text, plus some front matter and an index.208 Although the book
was usually bound as a single volume, one of the first things de
Grey did was to separate the pages into two volumes of
unequal size.209 The second volume has not been located and
may be lost; nonetheless, the division can be reconstructed
from a table of contents to both volumes that de Grey wrote on
the inside front cover of volume one and a separate index he
created covering both volumes.210 These sources suggest that
volume one primarily, though not completely, covered
substantive law, while evidence and procedure ended up in
volume two.211
207

See, e.g., Trial Report, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Dampier MS, Buller Bundle
51, at 2 (unnumbered) (Blackstone, J. relating in one trial report that he “in vain sent
all round East Grinstead for an Edition of ye Statutes, which had in it the Book of
Rates with the Rules thereunto annexed.”); see also PUB. ADVERTISER, Feb. 29, 1776, at
2 (judges at criminal trial in London calling for statute books and reading them prior to
commencing the case).
208
The booksellers were advertising the book “in sheets,” meaning unbound.
In addition, the dimensions of de Grey’s copy (11” (27.8 cm) x 8.5” (21.6 cm)), roughly
similar to copies in the British Library and Middle Temple indicate that the book could
not have been disbound and rebound, with the concomitant trimming.
209
What became volume one consists of pages 3-112, 125-92, 265-78, 299-306,
311-12. Most of the remaining pages ended up in volume two. The divisions did not
always occur along part or chapter lines, one result being that pages on occasion break
off or start in the middle of a sentence. In addition, the front matter, the original index,
and pages 1 and 2 are presumably missing entirely. De Grey evidently discarded any
pages that had no value to him. He did not need the title page or the dedication, for
example, and the table of contents was no longer relevant, as will be seen. The index
was also rendered unnecessary after he wrote his own. The likely explanation is that
de Grey wanted to trim the book as much as possible if he was going to carry it with
him on assize.
210
Index to William de Grey’s Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17.
211
The first volume includes all of part one, books one and two on injuries to
the person and injuries to personal property, respectively. It also includes the first two
chapters—on trespass and ejectment—of book three on injuries to real property. All of
part two, on contract, is in volume one, as is all of part three on actions given by
statute. The remaining sections in this volume come from two pockets carved out of
pages otherwise found in volume two. These pockets shifted to volume one consist of
pages 265-78 and 299-306. These include the material on notes and bills, Statute of
Frauds, juries, pleas puis darreign continuance, and abatement by death. Volume two,
by contrast, consisted of the old, mostly little used real property writs, the majority of
the long chapter on evidence, and most of the miscellaneous chapters on procedural
matters. De Grey’s reason for including the sections on bills and the Statute of Frauds
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However, de Grey did not stop with reorganizing the
Buller, because he also felt that the original book left out, or
failed to cover adequately, several areas of law that he
considered important.212 Sale of goods, for example, did not have
its own section in the Buller, neither did nuisance, nor such
procedural matters of importance to judges as special verdicts,
nonsuit, and granting certificates of notice to the court in

in volume one is easy to explain. Although the treatment of bills and notes occurs in
the long chapter on evidence, the section itself is mostly substantive. Furthermore, it
deals in part with contracts, a subject included in volume one, and mentions sale of
goods, about which de Grey included manuscript pages in volume one. The bills and
notes section also required several additional manuscript pages to hold all the
annotations. For reasons discussed below, de Grey likely wanted all the manuscript
additions to be in volume one. The two pages on the Statute of Frauds—not a separate
section in the Buller—remained in volume one essentially by accident. The bills and
notes section ended on the top of page 277, followed on the bottom of the page by the
beginning of Statute of Frauds, and 278 is the verso of 277. By contrast, the pages on
juries, pleas puis darreign continuance, and abatement by death have no obvious
connection to volume one. They all focus on procedural matters and none has a great
deal of marginalia.
Furthermore, retaining these pages in volume one forced de Grey to split
two gatherings, thereby orphaning pages in both volumes. Understanding this requires
an explanation of bookbinding techniques. Each page, or leaf, of a book, consisting of a
front and back (or recto and verso), is a folio. However, eighteenth-century books were
not composed of a stack of folia. Each page was in fact a double page—a bifolium—
consisting of four text pages. The bifolia were folded and nested together to form a
gathering, and the gatherings stacked to form the volume. In de Grey’s Nisi Prius, each
gathering had two bifolia, and the whole book consisted of forty-eight gatherings. To
give a concrete example, pages 1 to 8 made up the second gathering. The first
bifolium—the outer part of the gathering—was page 1 (recto) and 2 (verso) and also 7
(recto) and 8 (verso). The inside bifolium was page 3 (recto) and 4 (verso) and 5 (recto)
and 6 (verso). If de Grey pulled out a single leaf, it would have to be cut off its bifolium
partner, leaving a small tail in the margin. So, if de Grey removed page 1, page 8 would
be orphaned, and in order to bind it in, a small piece of the inside margin of page 1
would have to be left attached to page 8. Conversely, he might choose not to cut any
pages but rather to remove an entire bifolium. If he removed the bifolium composing
pages 3 to 6, for instance, the remaining pages would go: 1, 2, 7, 8. The last two pages
of volume one, 311-12, deal with bills of exception, which de Grey’s table of contents
lists in volume two though half the section is in volume one. These pages clearly ended
up in volume one because they are part of the bifolium with pages 305-06. De Grey
appears not to have cared much about them, since he wrote only one annotation on the
two pages and since he split the chapter on bills of exception in half in order to keep
311-12 in volume one, even though he had already divided the gathering of which they
were a part. What is odd is that de Grey split gatherings in other parts of the book, so
there would seem to be little reason not to do it with these two pages as well.
212
Evidence that de Grey was correct in believing that Buller’s treatment of
some of these topics was inadequate, or, if nonexistent, that they were necessary
additions can be found in ESPINASSE, supra note 199, at vii-viii, where he writes,
it may, perhaps, be considered as a more serious objection, that several very
material heads of the Law are totally omitted [from the Buller]. The Law of
Policies of Insurance, a part of the Law of great extent and importance, is not
touched on at all: The Law of Bills of Exchange and of Bankruptcy, very
imperfectly. . . .
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Westminster. De Grey’s response to these lacunae was to add
pages, some consisting of his own handwritten notes, others
coming perhaps from one or more printed sources.
To the front of volume one, he appended blank pages on
which he wrote his own entries on Servants’ Contracts,213 Sale
of Goods, Special Verdict, What Maintains the Issue, Damage
feasant, and Judge Certifying. At the end of the volume he
wrote a half page on usury and eleven additional pages of
overflow annotations from the book, in particular from the
section on bills of exchange.214 The pages in front were marked
A through M; the pages at the end were numbered 312a-312m,
312 being the last printed page in this volume.
In volume two, by contrast, de Grey added pages both at
the end and in the middle of the book, and all pages were
numbered, but the numbers were neither continuous with the
Buller pages nor in numerical order. The additional entries in
volume two are as follows:
[Evidence] What the Best ....... 381, 378
[Evidence] Copies of ............... 375
Demurr[e]r to Evidence ......... 299215

These additions fell in the middle of the volume, in the section
on evidence, coming between what de Grey in the table of
contents called “Evidence vivâ voce” at page 279 and “Bills of
Exceptions” at page 309.216 At the end of the table the list
continues:
Witnesses not attend[in]g ...... 385
Plees, w[hi]ch tryed first ........ 383

213

He did not list this page in the table of contents, perhaps because he
viewed it as overflow from the text. However, the Nisi Prius does not have a section on
master and servant, and the few scattered paragraphs to which de Grey crossreferenced his extra page mention servants only in passing. By contrast, he separately
lists the page on usury, even though he cross-references that page to a paragraph in
the text, which also mentions usury only in passing. It may be that he wrote the page
later, after the table of contents was made, though the writing shows no signs of the
distortion that would have occurred if it had been done after binding.
214
Usury was at 312a, followed by overflow notes on malicious persecution
(312b), false imprisonment (312c to 312e), rates (312f), trespass (312g), and bills and
notes (312h to 312m).
215
The Buller contained a section on demurrer to evidence at page 307, which
de Grey left out of his table of contents.
216
The Buller table of contents did not break up the content of the evidence
chapter nor were there subheadings in the text. De Grey created his own subheadings.
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[Insurance] Policies ................ 347217
General Issue ......................... 113a
Nonsuit &c. ............................. 365
Commoners Pleedgs [sic] &c. . 332
Nuisance ................................. 357
Insolvent Debtor .................... 380 363
Customs proved ...................... 335
Copyhold ................................. 113u
Customs & Prescriptions ....... 373
Commons ................................ 368

He also moved the Nisi Prius pages 253-264 (fraudulent
conveyances, wills of land, and stamps) out of order, extracting
them from the general discussion of evidence and sandwiching
them as a group between the last section of the book, on costs,
and the new material on witnesses not attending. The fact that
the pages in the second volume were in part arranged with no
semblance of numerical order apparently did not hinder de
Grey in using the book.
Without the second volume and without being able to
identify the source or sources of the extra material, which has
thus far proven elusive, it is not possible to demonstrate
conclusively how de Grey rebuilt his Nisi Prius. However, the
evidence that does exist suggests that he did what a modern
judge might do. He inserted his own notes in some places and
used the eighteenth-century equivalent of photocopying pages
from treatises in others.218
The handwritten additional pages in volume one
probably came from de Grey’s commonplace books. Nearly
every individual note is attributed to one or more reports, just
as they would be in a commonplace book. In volume two, pages
113a and 113u, resembling in their numbering the handwritten
pages in the back of volume one, suggest that de Grey might
have used notes he had written at the end of another book.
217

The Buller table of contents just reads “Policies,” but de Grey’s index
makes it clear that this refers to insurance. Index to William de Grey’s Nisi Prius,
Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, fol. 398; see also supra note 212.
218
Cf. BAKER & TAUSSIG, supra note 94, at 104 (ms. 270: printed attorney’s
manual bound with manuscript notes).
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These he may have cut out and inserted into the Nisi Prius, or
he may have recopied them, maintaining the original page
numbering so that he could find the originals easily in the book
from which they came.219
By contrast, it seems rather doubtful that the remaining
extra material came from de Grey’s notebooks. His equity
notebooks, his bench notebook from 1775-76, and his Nisi Prius
index suggest that he preferred relatively small, top-bound
lawyers’ notebooks.220 The Buller, by contrast, was a large folio
measuring 11” (27.8 cm) x 8.5” (21.6 cm). Not only would the
notebook pages have been significantly smaller, but they would
have had little marginal space for rebinding, and, because they
were top-bound, the writing on the back of each page would
have been upside-down if bound into the Buller along the side
margin. If de Grey had recopied the pages onto larger sheets, it
would have made little sense to retain the original page
numbering, because the size differential of the pages would
have meant that the pagination would quickly cease to
correspond. Furthermore, in volume one of the Buller, de Grey
numbered his additional manuscript pages consecutively, and
it is unclear why he would have chosen an inconsistent system
for volume two.
The logical explanation for the odd page numbering is
that the pages came already numbered, presumably meaning
they were pages from printed books.221 Although this raises the
question whether de Grey would have bought new copies to

219

De Grey’s index indicates that these sections consisted of multiple pages.
“Copyhold,” for instance, had at least four: 113u, 113w, 113x, and 113y. Index to
William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17, fols. 41-42. The index
lists only three pages for “General Issue”: 113c, 113d, 113e. Id. fol. 80.
220
Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17
(index); William de Grey Equity Notebooks, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS 178, 179,
180, 181, 182; William de Grey Bench Notebook, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS 183.
221
It is technically possible, given the page numbers listed in his Index, that
de Grey took all of the material from a single book. If so, then he reorganized them
entirely, as the table of contents demonstrates. Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius,
Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17. To give one example, the Index entry for
“Commoner[s],” contains references to pages 368-72 and 332-34. Id. De Grey’s table of
contents lists Commoners Pledges beginning at page 332, followed by some intervening
material by Customs Proved at 335, Customs & Prescriptions at 373, and Commoners
at 368. If his Index lists the contents of pages 332-34 under the same heading as the
contents of pages 368-72, it is not clear why de Grey would have kept them apart in the
book when he was already reordering the pages such that page 373 came before pages
368-72, and page 335 was separated from pages 332-34 by page 357 and page 380.
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take apart or cut pages out of existing books,222 the fact that the
pages of the other books would likely not correspond in size to
the Buller might explain why so much substantive law—
insurance policies, commoners, nuisance, etc.—ended up in the
volume dominated by procedure.223 Rather than have both
volumes be ungainly, de Grey may have wanted to put all the
odd-sized pages in one place.
However, after arranging his volumes and adding quite
a few additional pages, de Grey was only part way finished
with his reconstruction project. His next step was to annotate
the books. This he did in two steps. First he went through the
Buller and made signposting annotations in the inner margin.224
(See the picture of page 265 of de Grey’s book reproduced on
the following page.) He numbered the main points on each
page, starting from the top, and often wrote very brief
descriptions summarizing the issue covered by each point. On
some pages, he added additional text in the bottom margin, to
which he also assigned numbers following in order on the
marginal numbers he had placed next to the printed text.
These signposting annotations permitted de Grey to make
cross-referencing notes throughout the volume that pointed
him not only to a particular page but also to a paragraph or
even a sentence on that page.225
Nevertheless, if the signposting marginalia made the
book easier for de Grey to navigate, they did not fill the gaps he
found in the Buller. Consequently, on nearly every page, he
made extensive annotations, sometimes filling the margins and
even flowing over onto the following page and onto the pages
added at the end of the book. These notes provide a window
into the sorts of information de Grey felt that he needed to
have when preparing for trials.
222

Neither seems terribly likely, especially given that de Grey was something
of a bibliophile. This might argue that the source of the extra material was a single
book.
223
De Grey’s edition of Comyn’s Digest, for example, was a much larger work
than the Buller; whereas his Tryals per pais—a precursor to the Buller—was a far
smaller volume. The law library catalogue, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, lists the
Comyns under folio (fol. 1), as does the English Short Title Catalogue, citation number
T140618, and the Tryals per pais under octavo (fol. 8), as does the English Short Title
Catalogue, citation number T121428.
224
These annotations clearly preceded the other notes, because de Grey had to
write his longer notes around them. Among the evidence that de Grey actually read the
book fairly carefully are the corrections he makes throughout to typographical errors.
225
Thus, a note such as the one found at the very bottom of the illustration on
the next page that reads “v. 267.4” meant, “see page 267, point 4.” William de Grey's
Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17.
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The disjointed mélange of substantive rules,
instructions on proper pleading, and strings of case squibs in
Buller’s Nisi Prius offered the lawyer a checklist of sorts. If his
client had been accused of conversion, for instance, the Nisi
Prius explained what evidence had to be proved, beginning
with the general reminder that “it must be known how the
Goods came to his Hands,” then proceeding through a series of
specific scenarios relating to refusal to return a good: a carrier’s
failing to deliver, an inn-keeper retaining possession of a
guest’s horse, an attorney’s refusing to turn over a document,
and so on.226

De Grey’s Annotations in his Nisi Prius. Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/18,
428X4. Reprinted by courtesy of the Norfolk Record Office, Norwich, England.
226

Id. at 44-45.
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To this material, de Grey added notes that
supplemented, explained, and even occasionally questioned the
text, and in so doing readied himself to perform the primary
tasks of a trial judge: instructing the jury and making decisions
on motions. This required him to know the law in detail, of
course, and to be able to call up the signature cases, but
perhaps even more importantly, he had to be prepared to
address and parry counsels’ arguments, and he had to have
sufficient depth and breadth of knowledge such that he could
deal with unusual cases and explain his decisions in a manner
that sounded authoritative and convincing. He used different
sorts of marginal notations to meet these needs.
Most of the annotations elucidated the law in greater
detail than did the Nisi Prius, providing the more obscure
exception or paraphrasing another case on a slightly narrower
point. So, for example, the text discussing the special right of
an innkeeper to refuse to hand over a horse until his feed had
been paid for gave rise to this marginal comment:
[A]n innkeeper cannot by law sell a horse for his feed except in
London and Exeter, and there by custom the innkeeper may call 4
neighbours and value the horse and meat, and if the meat is worth
the horse, the property is changed and he may sell.227

In an interlinear note on the same text, de Grey also observed,
“nor can a stable keeper retain because not obliged to take
in.”228
His annotations could grow quite long. To the text
addressing the husband’s liability for the debts of his wife due
to the “Credit the Law gives her by Implication in Respect of
Cohabitation,” de Grey added,
even during cohabitation they should be proper for her rank and by
Holt, where she bought fine Clothes, unknown to Husband, and left
them at a Friend’s house, and dressed and undressed there and went
into public and visited, Husband not liable. 1. Never came to his use.
2. Secrecy takes away presumption of consent. Contra, if he had seen
her in them. 3. Not necessary apparel. He is liable during his life for
her debts contracted before coverture. If she is used to trade by
herself, and takes up goods, he is liable because cohabitation. If he
declares his dissent, so that it came to the knowledge of the
tradesman or his servant, Husband not liable. She must be content
227

Id. at 45 marginal note a. The actual text of the note reads: “an Innkeeper
cannot by Law sell a Horse for His Feed Salk 388 except in London & Exeter, & there
by Custom the Innkeeper may call 4 Neighbours & value the Horse & meat & If the
meat is worth the Horse, the Property is changed & He may sell.”
228
Id. at 45 interlinear note at end of carry-over paragraph.
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with what he provides her or apply to Spiritual Court. If she takes
up silks and pawns them, Husband is not answerable because they
did not come to his use.229

With such notes, de Grey readied a checklist so that he would
have at hand the factors he might have to list for a jury or upon
which he could base a decision.
He displayed a similar interest in thoroughness in
reacting directly to Buller’s case summaries. Where de Grey
thought that Buller had described a case inadequately, he
would fill in additional facts,230 and where he felt that the Nisi
Prius’s treatment of a subject was incomplete, he would add
more cases. In the discussion of defamation, for instance, he
added several more case squibs, including one about King v.
Newport, heard during Hilary Term 1728 by the Chief Justice
of King’s Bench, Lord Robert Raymond, at a trial held in the
Guildhall in London. In that case, de Grey wrote, an
information was brought “for publishing a libel called ‘the Post
Boy’ in which was contained a paragraph reflecting on A. It is
not sufficient to prove that Defendant ordered that paragraph
229

Id. at 132 marginal note c. The note reads,
d

even during Cohabitation They sh be proper for Her rank and by Holt, where
d
She bought fine Cloaths, unknown to Husb , & left em at a Friends house, &
dresst and undresst there & went into pub. & visited, Hus. not liable 1. never
came to his use. 2. Secrecy takes away Presumption of consent. Contra, if He
had seen Her in Them. 3. not necessary apparel. He is liable during His L for
her debts contracted bef. coverture. 3. W. 411. If she is used to trade by
Herself, & takes up Goods, He is liable bec. Cohabit. Holt. Salk. 113. If he
t
declares his dissent, so y it came to the Knowledge of the Tradesman or His
t
th
t
Serv ., H. not liable. She must be content w w . he provides Her or apply to
l
t
Spir C . Ld R 1006. If She takes up Silks & pawns them, H. is not answerable
o
bec. they did not come to His use. d & Salk 118.
For a similar example, see id. at 266 marginal note o:
g

There are 3 sorts of Protests. 1. When party can’t be found. 2. refus to accept.
g
3. refus to pay—protest proves itself. A Protest of a Foreign Bill is part of the
n
st
Constitut of the Custom enabling the Payee to recover ag . Drawer. Ld R.
993[,] Salk 131. If He has protested for non-acc. He may tender the bill for
t
t
paym . when the time comes; & then He protests for non-paym . V. J. Strange
Can. 39 on the first He sends the Protest on the Last, the Protest (& Bill. Q.
st
this i[s] bec. of recovery ag Drawer).
230

For instance, see id. at 28 interlinear note to Buller’s description of
Woolston v. Scott (1753), about proof of marriage even by non-Anglicans, where de Grey
wrote,
& This was an Anabaptist; & not in the Church nor by the Church Service; &
n
n
st
not being a Q to be certifyed by the Bp. but act ag a wrongdoer Denison J.
d
d
was so clear
He w . not suffer it to be debated but s they might move for a
ch
L
new Trial, w they did not do. tho’ dam were 500 .
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to be inserted, it being a charge for publishing the whole Post
Boy.”231
Although the Nisi Prius focused on cases, it also
provided some model forms. In such instances, de Grey used
his annotations to offer alternative phrasing, presumably to
remind himself what changes would not vitiate the form. As
part of a form for a bill of exception asking that a case be heard
en banc, Buller provided the instruction, “(So set out the
Evidence on both Sides, and then proceed as follows)
‘Whereupon the said Council for the said Defendants, did then
and there insist . . . ,’”232 to which de Grey added, “or ‘P offered
to give in evidence,’ or ‘Defendant’ or either party ‘insisted that
such evidence ought not to have been admitted,’ or ‘desired the
Judge to inform the Jurors or declare to them the Law to be’
etc.”233
Although most annotations provided additional law or
cases to supplement the text of the Buller, de Grey also
extended his own thinking into analogous matters. In one note
he wrote, “In contracts, action by sole Plaintiff, Defendant may
prove Plaintiff a partner with other. Contra in tort; must plead
it. If Plaintiff should recover for half the wrong, it would
discharge the whole.”234 In another annotation he explained, “a
plea that A was bankrupt within the several acts is enough
without saying how. Contra of simonist to show some act that
brings them within the statute because it does not mention the
word simony.”235
A number of de Grey’s notes pertained to judges and
judging. He was quite interested in the doctrinal disputes of his
231

Id. at 5 marginal note 4. The note reads,
n

g

ch

but in Informat for publish a Libell called “the Post Boy” in wh was
t
contain’d a Paragraph reflecting on A. it is not sufficient to prove y D. order’d
g
That Paragraph to be Inserted, it being a Charge for publish the whole Post
g
d
boy. K & Newport. H. 13. G. 1. G.H. Raym . C.J.
232

Id. at 312.
Id. at 312 marginal note s. The note reads, “or ‘P. offer’d to give in Evid.’ or
‘Def’ or Either Party ‘Insisted that such Evid. ought not to have been admitted’ or
‘desired the Judge to inform the Jurors or declare to them the Law to be’ &c.”
Regarding the word “evidence” in the text, de Grey noted, at note m, “all the Evidence,
ch
n
& not That only on w . the Q . arises.” Id. at 312 marginal note m.
234
n
Id. at 149 marginal note m. The note reads, “In Contracts, act by Sole P.
th
r
d
D. may prove P. a Partner w oth Contra in Torts must plead it. If P. sh . recover for
d
e
half the wrong it w disch. y whole v. Salk. 440 290 2 Lev. 56, 112. 2 Mod 82. 3 K 39.”
235
t
t
Id. at 43 marginal note s. The note reads, “a Plea y A was a Bank . within
l
t
g
t
the Sev acts is eno’ w . say How—Contra of Simonist to shew some act y brings Him
e
within y Stat. bec. it does not mention the word Simony. Comb. 108.”
233
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predecessors, in particular the renowned judges of the early
and mid-eighteenth century. Perhaps so that he would know
where the pitfalls lay, he devoted many annotations to a review
of these disagreements. To give a brief example, though these
sorts of notes were often quite long, regarding a text about setoff in the context of a bankruptcy, he wrote, “Eyre C.J. held
Defendant could not set off against assignees, a debt due to him
from bankrupt. Afterwards Willes, C.J. doubted on such point
and gave no opinion.”236
Just as de Grey was interested in what other judges had
decided and thought in specific cases, he also provided himself
with reminders of things he needed to keep in mind when he
was on the bench. With regard to a jury viewing a crime scene,
he wrote, “The Judge at Nisi Prius may direct it. If 3 attend at
the View, or if 6, and 3 at the Trial, it is Sufficient. They may
inform the rest. The Court may compel attendance by amercing
absentees for a contempt.”237 In another place, where Buller
stated that it was at the discretion of the judge whether to hear
a plea from defendant that some new evidence had arisen after
the issue was joined but before trial,238 de Grey noted that, “it
may be tried perhaps so far as to enable the judge to see
whether he ought to accept or reject it, not to join issue on it.”239
Finally, de Grey did not limit himself to strictly legal
observations. His marginalia also contain the occasional bits of
history, background explanation, and color. Annotating a
discussion of the length of time after her husband’s death that
a woman was considered to have given birth to a legitimate
child, he wrote, citing a work on civil law, “9 months & 10 days,
30 days [per] month solar, not lunar; may be a perfect birth at
7. May go 10 or more—at Wittenburg one held legitimate in

236

Id. at 177 marginal note at the top of the page. The note reads, “Eyre C.J.
t
d
st
t
ds
held Def . c not set off ag assignees, a debt due to Him from B . afterw Willes. C. J.
doubted on such point & gave no opinion.”
237
Id. at 300 note m. The note reads,
The Judge at ni: Pri: may direct it—If 3 attend at the View or if 6, & 3 at the
t
t
Trial, it is Suffic they may Inform the rest. the C . may compel attendance by
g
d
n
r
amerc absentees for a Contempt. L Hard. In D . of Ely & S . J. Stuart. 5
June 1746.
238

Id. at 95.
Id. at 95 note w. The note reads, “1 Sid. 238 says it may be tried Perhaps
r
so far as to enable the Judge to see W He ought to accept or reject it. not to join Issue
on it.”
239
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11th month; at Paris, 14 months after.”240 When Buller
discussed the origin of trials at nisi prius, de Grey added,
“Circuits first erected into 6 by Henry 2, A.D. 1179, 3 Judges to
each,” and cited Paul Rapin de Thoyras’ History of England, a
work he owned.241 At the beginning of the chapter on trover, de
Grey explained, “it is an action on the right. Trespass on
possession; it was introduced instead of detinue to avoid wager
of law; and of trespass to avoid the necessity of pleading
specially. Yet it is founded on tort, and sounds in trespass.”242
The marginalia show that de Grey sought to have at his
fingertips the various types of information that would help him
decide questions of law, give explanations to juries, and engage
with counsel. He put into his notes not just the rules and
checklists, but also summaries of judges’ discussions,
conflicting opinions, pointers to analogous concepts, and bits
and pieces of background material that would prepare him to
address all the angles and arguments that might arise.
According to his accounts, de Grey completed the
restructuring and annotation of the Buller over the course of at
most two weeks during early December 1772.243 Under those
240

Id. at 112 marginal note o. The note reads, “9 mo. & 10 days. 30 days to
mo. solar. not lunar. may be a Perfect birth at 7.—may go 10. or more—at Wittenburgh
th
one held legitimate in 11 mo.—at Paris, 14 mo. after. v. Redley’s Civil Law. 55.”
241
Id. at 299 note m, which reads, “Circuits first erected into 6. by Hen. 2.
A.D. 1179. 3 Judges to Each 1 Rapin 239.” The Rapin is listed in a 1732 edition in his
home library, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/2, fol. 5. If de Grey was using the 1732
edition, however, he got the page number wrong. The correct page was 276, and the
year Rapin referred to was 1176. Similarly, on page 180 at marginal note c, to the text
“the Hundred within which any Robbery is committed shall be answerable for the
same,” William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17 ,de Grey wrote:
“a neighbor by 1 Rapin 151 means ‘near pledge’ or ‘Burghs’ 10 families composing one,
& the Heads pledging for Each other—Qui est in Eadem vice. but in West 2. extending
Stat. Merton to neighbors & neighbor means all in adjoining Towns. 2 Ins 474 . . . .” Id.
at 180 marginal note c. The correct page in the 1732 edition was 179, and the Rapin
text speaks of a “near security” rather than a “near pledge.”
242
n
n
Id. at 32 note d, which reads, “it is an act . on the right. Trespass on Poss .
it was introduced instead of detinue to avoid wager of Law; & of Trespass, to avoid the
necessity of pleading specially. yet it is founded on Tort, & sounds in Trespass.”
243
According to his accounts, he bought the book in December 1772, though
the account does not indicate when in the month he made the purchase, and it could
be, perhaps, that the book had been purchased somewhat earlier. Accounts of William
de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/10/43. The archives also contain a receipt from
a bookbinder that reads, “Rec’d Dec[embe]r 16. 1772 Of the Rt. Hon. Lord Grey the
Sum of Nine Shillings for binding two vols. of Nisi Prius in Vellum . . . .” Record of
Payment, Binding of Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/11/43. The same
receipt indicates that two days later de Grey paid an additional 2 shillings sixpence for
unspecified alterations. Id. The total price of 11 s. 6 d. for binding in vellum is odd. By
comparison, de Grey paid 7 s. to have two large folio volumes of the Journals of the
House of Commons half-bound in leather in April 1772. Record of Payment, Binding of
Journals of the House of Commons, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/10/3. Based on the
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circumstances, it comes as no surprise that his annotations do
not appear to represent new research. Most of the authorities
cited in the annotations came ultimately out of sixteenth-,
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century reporters. When de
Grey cited unreported cases and attributed them to a specific
judge, the judges mentioned most frequently were those,
current and recently past, of greatest prominence when he was
a student and young barrister in the late 1730s and 1740s.244
Citations to cases and to the judges serving during the years of
his mature practice were very rare. Despite Mansfield’s
importance to the jurisprudential development of the time, he
was never mentioned by name, and only one case was cited
from Burrow’s reports of Mansfield’s opinions.245 De Grey’s
predecessor on Common Pleas, John Eardley Wilmot, merited
only two mentions,246 and de Grey made only three references to
cases decided during his own first two years on the Court.247
Furthermore, he did not continue to update the Nisi Prius with
new law made while he was on the bench.248 Apparently, he
intended his copy of the Buller exclusively as a storage place
for older precedents. Very likely he used separate bench
notebooks to record new material.249
Given the speed with which the book was compiled, the
best explanation for the choice of sources is that he copied from
predigested material and did not, except perhaps in rare
instances, return to the original reporters to cull material for
fact that the marginalia show no sign of the distortion that would have occurred had he
done them after binding, he must have completed the annotations prior to this date.
244
These include most prominently, John Holt (Chief Justice of King’s Bench
1689-1710), Robert Raymond (Chief Justice of King’s Bench 1725-1733), Lord
Hardwicke (Chief Justice of King’s Bench 1733-1737, Chancellor 1737-1756), William
Lee (Chief Justice of King’s Bench 1737-1754), Robert Eyre (justice on King’s Bench
1710-1723, Chief Baron of the Exchequer 1723-1725, Chief Justice of Common Pleas
1725-1735), and John Willes (Chief Justice of Common Pleas 1737-1761).
245
William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, at 86
marginal note c.
246
Id. at 88 marginal note a, 103 marginal note c.
247
Id. at 5 marginal note 4, 103 marginal note c. Both have references to 1772
cases before Common Pleas. See id. at 274 marginal note m for a reference to a
Common Pleas case from 1771.
248
For instance, he decided a case in 1776 that was exactly on point with
notes he made on page 133 of the Buller concerning elopement, yet he did not add a
citation to the later case. Hatchett v. Baddeley, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1079, 1080-82; Inner
Temple MS 97, fols. 132, 133-39, 140-41.
249
We know, for instance, that he kept a bench notebook when sitting at
Westminster. The one from 1775-76 is extant, and it mentions other notebooks, e.g.,
William de Grey Bench Notebook, Lincoln’s Inn Library, MS. 183, fol. 2r (“v. my
st
t
notes”); id. fol. 4v (“v. 1 arg . from vol: 97 & Popes Book.”).
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his annotations. While he could have copied from someone
else’s annotated Nisi Prius, certain stylistic similarities with
the method of annotation in his equity notebooks tend to argue
against this.250 Instead, a quirk in the form of the marginalia
suggests the hypothesis that de Grey created the notes by
searching his own commonplace books for relevant cases and
observations. This quirk is that he used only thirteen letters (a,
b, c, d, h, k, m, n, o, s, w, x, and z) to key the text to the
marginalia. For example, an “a” written above a word in the
text led him to a note in the margin marked with an “a.”251
The letters did not correspond to placement on the page.
He made no obvious attempt to use the letters in order from top
to bottom, nor did he always use certain letters in the top,
middle, or bottom quadrants of the page. Furthermore, he
occasionally used the same letter multiple times on a single
page, corresponding to different annotations.252 It is likely,
therefore, that each letter referred to a specific source, and
given the fact that the notes corresponding to a certain letter
do not come from the same book—for instance, the “m” notes
refer to cases from many different reporters—and that no other
published book covered the same material as the Buller, it is
rather unlikely that de Grey was using printed material.253
A more plausible hypothesis is that de Grey used his
own notebooks and commonplace books. If so, he worked
something like this. He began by pulling only the thirteen
notebooks that contained relevant material. The notebooks
were likely labeled with letters.254 For each topic in the Buller,
250

He also uses the first person on occasion. See, e.g., William de Grey's Nisi
Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, at 66 marginal note c (“I always do it.”); id.
at 189 interlinear note after last line (“I suppose not liable to penalty.”).
251
Of these, a, c, m, and s were by far the most common. The letters b, d, k, n,
o, x, w, and z were infrequently used. The letter z was used only once; x four times; d
five times; n seven times; o eleven times; b twelve times; w fifteen times; k sixteen
times.
252
For example, m is used three times in the text on page 88, keyed to two
different notes, see id. at 88, or where m and o are both used twice, keyed to different
notes. See id. at 274.
253
Of course, the choice could simply be random. That is, de Grey liked using
these particular letters, perhaps because he felt they were distinct and would not be
confused with other letters. But if the letters were indeed chosen at random, one might
expect a more random distribution. And yet, certain letters predominate throughout
the book, and other letters are used in fits and starts. In the first 125 pages of de
Grey’s copy of the Nisi Prius, for example, “o” appears only on pages 5 and 112, and “n”
shows up on pages 13, 33, and 89. In the same range, “m” appears on almost every page
that has annotations.
254
See, e.g., the eighteenth-century notebooks of Charles Fearne at the Middle
Temple library, labeled on the spine with letters.
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he looked through the notebooks, starting generally with the
one corresponding to the letter “a,” because the “a” annotation
was usually placed in the top margin.255 He may normally have
ended with the notebooks “s” and “w,” because those notes were
often written in the bottom margin.
If de Grey were indeed using his own notebooks, it
would not be at all exceptional to find that most of the citations
came from reporters and judges prominent in the 1730s and
1740s when he was a young barrister building up his personal
library of legal reference material.256 Increasing the likelihood
that this was how de Grey worked are two other examples of
judges using this sort of letter system to refer to their own
notebooks. In his commonplace book, Sir Matthew Hale
marked each entry with a letter code to denote the notebook
from which he had taken the case he was abstracting.257 A
similar system is apparent in a notebook of cases that might
have been owned by Justice Gould or one of the justices of the
Common Pleas who immediately preceded de Grey on the
court.258
The amount of work de Grey put into remaking his Nisi
Prius suggests he placed a great deal of importance upon
having a compact circuit reference book that gathered together
all the relevant law previously recorded in a number of
different notebooks. That such a reference could have been
useful is demonstrated by a manuscript report of a trial for
slander over which de Grey presided in London, recorded,
ironically, in an anonymous lawyer’s copy of Buller’s Nisi
Prius.259 “This was an Action for calling the Plt. a Sodomite & a
Bugger[e]r,” began the report. The question was whether
255

One reason an “a” note might be displaced is because the top margin is
already filled with a note carried over from the prior page. See, e.g., William de Grey's
Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, at 269.
256
The system could also explain why he evidently on occasion forgot to write
the key letter at the beginning of a note and only added it above the annotation later,
and why he sometimes did not place a key letter in the text of the Nisi Prius, even if he
did write it in front of the annotation. If he were copying notes from another Buller,
these sorts of omissions would be unlikely, since he would copy exactly what he saw.
But if he had to go back and forth between notebooks, searching for, then copying or
maybe only paraphrasing into the Nisi Prius what he had written in the notebook, he
may easily have lost track of the letter of the source notebook or forgotten which word
exactly had spurred him to make this notation.
257
2 J.H. BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: A DESCRIPTIVE LIST 365-66 (1990).
258
BAKER & TAUSSIG, supra note 94, at 148 (ms. 381).
259
Id. at 80 (ms. 217) (the case, from the “Sittings after Mich[aelma]s Term”
possibly 1778, is reported on the interleaved page between text pages 8-9).
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defendant had a right to make such a comment because she
was speaking to the plaintiff’s wife, her niece, and speaking out
of concern. The Nisi Prius, and one of de Grey’s annotations,
squarely addressed this legal issue in the chapter on slander.260
The last question is whether de Grey actually used his
bench book. The evidence is indirect because, notwithstanding
the example just given, his nisi prius trials were rarely
reported, and he did not update the book with new law. First, a
bookmark remains in the book. It is a scrap of paper torn from
a book auction catalogue that can be identified as dating to
around February 1777,261 and the summer 1777 assize may
have been the last time de Grey rode circuit.262 Second, a piece
of paper is folded and tucked between pages 312d and 312e. It
contains fragmentary notes on at least two different legal
issues—lack of proof in an action for possession of real property
by prescription and an action for a ship—neither of which
correspond to marginalia in the book, and which could possibly
be trial notes. Third, the Buller was not included in either of de
Grey’s library catalogues, and it found its way into the archives
with his papers. This suggests that it was a desk book, a book
for use, and not a book for sitting on the shelf.
Finally, there is de Grey’s index. The Buller came with
an index, but de Grey ignored it and created a new one in a
separate notebook. He relied neither on the headings in the
Buller index nor on its list of topics under each heading but
instead devised his own. The Buller index, for example, begins
with: Abatement, Abuttals, Account, Actions, Administration,
and Admittance, while the de Grey index begins: Almanacs,
Abatements, Abstract, Attaint, Awards, Assets Real.263 Under
260

BULLER, supra note 197, at 10.
Bookmark Between Pages 162-63 in William de Grey’s Nisi Prius, Norfolk
Record Office, WLS LV/17. The paper was torn from BENJAMIN WHITE, A CATALOGUE
OF SEVERAL LIBRARIES LATELY PURCHASED, CONTAINING A VERY LARGE COLLECTION OF
THE MOST VALUABLE BOOKS IN EVERY LANGUAGE AND CLASS OF LEARNING 219-20 (n.d.)
(the catalogue indicates that “The Books will begin to be Sold on Thursday the 6th of
February, 1777”).
262
According to his accounts, serjeants seem to have gone the circuit for him
in the summers of 1778 and 1779. Accounts of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office,
WLS LV/15/5 (Sept. 22, 1778), WLS LV/16/18 (Dec. 23, 1779) (gratuities of £10 de Grey
paid to Serjeant Foster and Serjeant Heath respectively in appreciation for their taking
over his assize circuit during those summers). He was supposed to go on circuit with
Blackstone in 1776 but did not because of an attack of the gout. PREST, supra note 156,
at 261. De Grey generally appears to have skipped the lent assize, as did Chief Justice
Mansfield. 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 129.
263
Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17,
fol. 1 (unpaginated first page).
261
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each heading, de Grey included anywhere from one to dozens of
listings summarizing, in a manner similar to Buller, the point
referenced. For instance, under “Lost Evidence” he wrote:264
1. Postea, proved by associate 343.8.
2. Verdict [proved] by his Notes ib. 9
3. Circumst[antia]l Proof of orig[ina]l suffic[ien]t ib.9
4. Record proved by a Copy 229.3265

And the list continues for another two pages. All of this
organizing and summarizing must have taken de Grey a quite
substantial amount of time, and the index is entirely in his
hand. He would have had little reason to do all this work
unless he believed that he needed a means to access the
information he had stored in his Nisi Prius. Furthermore, the
index shows signs of a certain amount of updating. In
particular, the last several pages of the notebook contain notes
on customs officials deriving from cases heard en banc by
Common Pleas between 1772 and 1777.266 These additional
notes indicate that de Grey continued to make use of the index,
and the index would have been useless without his
reconstructed Buller volumes nearby.
V.

CONCLUSION

The fortuitous preservation in the de Grey archives of
traces of his approach to his own judicial education cracks open
a tiny window into this mysterious rite of passage that judges
have undergone for centuries. In revering its judges, the
264

Id. at fol. 100.
The number represents the page number followed by de Grey’s own
internal marginal numbering.
266
The first page and a half of notes follow the standard practice of the rest of
the index, with each new entry being consecutively numbered and taking up one or two
lines. But the remaining pages read more like bench notes, abstracting judges’ opinions
from a case heard en banc; see also 1) a reference on fol. 32 in the section on Certificate
of Judge to a case from 1778 (or 1775, the 8’s and 5’s on rare occasions can be difficult
to tell apart), Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17;
2) the entry on fol. 33 [116] added at the end of the section on Criminal Conversation,
reading: “Prostit[utio]n bef[ore] marr[iage] Ev[idence] to mitigate If Husb[and] knew it
then. Ld Mansf[iel]d—If did not. Q[uery] by me.” Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius,
Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, fols. 32-33. De Grey and Mansfield obviously did
not sit on the same court, and it seems unlikely that this entry referred to a case
considered by the judges together in Serjeants’ Inn. But Mansfield and de Grey did ride
circuit together during the Summer assize of 1777. 2 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD
MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 1498.
265
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common law systems have been loath to acknowledge that they
do not always, or even very often, come to the bench prepared
to serve. And in desiring, perhaps, to preserve their aura of
authority, judges, too, have been reluctant to admit to their
own deficiencies. Fortunately, the recent era of the baby judge
schools has seen a growing transparency about the need for
judicial training.267 Such openness facilitates the study of
judicial education, and the topic deserves more attention than
it has received from either modern scholars or legal historians.
If the sources from which judges learn their law affect the law
they make, then uncovering and investigating those sources
might provide significant insights into how and why the law
developed as it has.268

267

On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 144.
See, for example, observations that what judges learn at baby judges
school later affects their judging in Arnold, supra note 13, at 771 (“[T]he impetus
towards settlement is becoming the major theme, it seems to me, in classes that are
held for new judges.”); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries,
Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 79 n.74 (2006) (“[T]here are . . .
pressures to keep you in line. In baby judge school, one trainer went so far as to begin a
session on employment discrimination by saying, ‘here’s how you get rid of these
cases!’” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
268

